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INTRODUCTION 
Listen for a while to crime victims and you will hear both frustra-
tion and resignation about plea bargaining, but you will hear no true 
believers.  Some crime victims sound relieved that the plea bargain 
spares them from the prolonged ordeal of a trial:  as one woman put 
it, “I just want it over with.”1  Others take comfort in the idea that a 
guilty plea holds the defendant responsible:  “It’s what we were look-
ing for the last three years . . . . He admitted that he was involved and 
played a part.”2  Some note that the plea eliminates any risk of acquit-
tal at trial:  “I know there are people out there who do far worse and 
get off for their crimes.”3
Alongside these lukewarm endorsements, there are plenty of 
comments on the negative side of the ledger.  Victims frequently say 
the punishment that the defendant received after a plea bargain was 
not what they expected, complaining about “a slap on the wrist.”4  
1 Gwen Filosa, Woman Changes Guilty Plea in Killing, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Or-
leans), May 4, 2004, at B-1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting a murder vic-
tim’s mother after the alleged killer changed her guilty plea); see also Carol Demare, 
Victim at Peace with Boxley Plea Deal, TIMES UNION (Albany), Dec. 24, 2003, at B1 (quot-
ing the sexual assault victim of a politically powerful defendant as saying, “[a]ctually, I 
was relieved that a plea bargain could be reached,” and noting that she was “extremely 
nervous” about testifying). 
2 Thomasi McDonald, Parents Accept Wreck Penalty, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), 
July 2, 2004, at B1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting a manslaughter vic-
tim’s father, who was responding to the killer’s acceptance of a plea bargain); see also 
Demare, supra note 1, at B1 (quoting the victim as saying, “I felt most importantly that 
Boxley be held accountable for what he did and [the plea] took care of that”). 
3 Sarah Coppola, Sentence Has Some Victims Unhappy, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 
1, 2004, at B1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting a victim, familiar with the 
plea bargaining system through her employment with Child Protective Services, who 
was responding to the plea bargain accepted by a man guilty of improper photogra-
phy). 
4 See, e.g., Alan Gomez, Delray Pastor To Serve No Time for Molestation, PALM BEACH 
POST, June 25, 2004, at 1C (discussing the case of a pastor who received five years pro-
bation as punishment for sexually molesting a nine-year-old girl); see also, e.g., John 
Caher, Ex-Assembly Counsel Boxley Sentenced to a Misdemeanor, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 24, 2004, at 1 
(quoting a sexual assault victim after her assaulter was sentenced only on a misde-
meanor sex count); Coppola, supra note 3, at B1 (discussing the plea bargain of two 
years imprisonment accepted by a defendant who secretly videotaped 500 women in 
the dressing room of a gym); McDonald, supra note 2, at B1 (quoting a manslaughter 
victim’s father who said, in response to a plea bargain of thirty-six months probation 
and a suspended license, “[B]asically there were no dire consequences”).  For survey 
evidence about popular disapproval of plea bargaining, see Stanley A. Cohen & An-
thony N. Doob, Public Attitudes to Plea Bargaining, 32 CRIM. L.Q. 85, 103 (1989) (con-
cluding that “[m]ost Canadians disapprove of the process of plea bargaining”); Patricia 
A. Payne, Plea Bargaining:  A Necessary Evil?, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CRIME AND JUSTICE 
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Some question the judgment of prosecutors who are overly driven by a 
fear of losing or the emotional costs of a trial:  “[The prosecutor] told 
me that if they went to trial and he gets acquitted, she couldn’t live 
with that . . . . It’s not for her to live with.  It’s for me.”5  For others, 
the problem with a plea bargain is that it blocks the public from learn-
ing the full story of the defendant’s crime:  “it prevents all the facts 
from coming out.”6  Worst of all, plea bargaining can pressure some 
defendants to accept convictions for crimes they did not commit.7
It is little wonder that crime victims demonstrate such contradic-
tory, even confused, reactions to plea bargains.  Those of us who study 
or work in criminal justice full-time are likewise conflicted and con-
fused about the practice, and as a result we have not yet created ade-
quate ways to change plea negotiations for the better. 
Our current discussions of plea bargains offer little hope of im-
proving matters because they take place either at too high or too low a 
level of abstraction.  Sometimes we evaluate plea bargains at the case 
level.  The trial judge asks whether a particular defendant entered a 
“knowing and voluntary” guilty plea, founded on some “factual basis.”8  
232, 232 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 1994) (describing common public concerns regarding 
plea bargaining); Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice, in 16 
CRIME AND JUSTICE:  A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 99, 149 (Michael Tonry ed., 1992) (dis-
cussing studies that have shown that a majority of Americans and Canadians disap-
prove of plea bargaining). 
5 See Gwen Filosa, Family of Dead Teen is Against Plea Deal, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans), Apr. 6, 2004, at B-1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the mother 
of a homicide victim); see also Coppola, supra note 3, at B1 (noting the prosecutor’s 
hesitation to try an alleged improper photographer in nine separate cases, in part be-
cause of the emotional drain on victims); Gomez, supra note 4, at 1C (quoting a victim 
who said that in offering a plea bargain, prosecutors were too preoccupied with the 
emotional toll a trial would put on her); Fred Lebrun, Courtroom Shift Spurs New Debate, 
TIMES UNION (Albany), Feb. 24, 2004, at B1 (quoting the victim as saying, “I was eager 
to avoid a trial the district attorney’s office said we could not win”). 
6 See Rex Bowman, Former Law-School Student Gets Life for Three Slayings, RICHMOND 
TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 28, 2004, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the 
attorney for students wounded by a shooter); see also Rose Dunn, Letter to the Editor, 
Plea Bargain Wasn’t Punishment Enough, HOME NEWS TRIB. (East Brunswick, N.J.), Dec. 
25, 2003, at A15 (responding to the plea bargain in an aggravated manslaughter case 
by asking, “Why was this case decided by two people instead of a jury?”). 
7 See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions:  Do We Reliably 
Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1342 (1997) (“[A] rational [but inno-
cent] defendant who is likely to be convicted may choose the lesser sentence resulting 
from a plea bargain rather than risk erroneous conviction.”). 
8 For various formulations of the standards for factual basis, voluntariness, and 
knowledge, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2) (“Before accepting a plea of guilty . . . , the 
court must address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the 
plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises (other than prom-
ises in a plea agreement).”); FED R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3) (“Before entering judgment on a 
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Any plea meeting this standard will be legally sound and will meet the 
approval of most judges and attorneys.  Yet this standard that courts 
use to evaluate guilty pleas at the individual case level is anemic, since 
the facts supporting guilty pleas can be remarkably thin, and many 
“knowing” and “voluntary” guilty pleas are nevertheless coercive and 
unjust. 
At other times, we evaluate plea bargaining at a very high level of 
abstraction, treating this disposition of criminal cases as a social insti-
tution that deserves our embrace, or our acquiescence, or our con-
demnation as a whole.  Perhaps we should think of plea bargaining as 
a method of making criminal adjudication more efficient;9 perhaps 
instead we should consider it a squalid and unnecessary procedural 
shortcut.10  In any case, the point of thinking at this highest level of 
abstraction is to evaluate the impact of all plea bargains on criminal 
justice and on the social order. 
This vantage point, considering plea bargaining as a social institu-
tion, delivers genuine insights about the practice, yet it is also enervat-
ing.  Because no one will abolish plea bargains entirely from the 
American criminal courtroom,11 what we need is a regulatory strategy 
rather than further insights on the question of abolition.  The case- 
and society-wide levels of analysis have not shown us where to regulate 
or how to sort the good plea bargains from the bad ones. 
A mid-level theory would fit better with the current reality of plea 
bargaining in the United States and would best mark the road to re-
form.  This sort of theory would allow us to analyze guilty pleas at the 
system level for each jurisdiction, recognizing that in some places plea 
bargain practices are relatively benign, while in others there is some-
thing amiss in bargain justice. 
guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.”), and 
compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.2(a) (2004) (“[T]he court may 
accept [a charge bargain] if . . . the remaining charges adequately reflect the serious-
ness of the actual offense behavior and . . . accepting the agreement will not under-
mine the statutory purposes of sentencing or the sentencing guidelines.”). 
9 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 
289, 289 (1983) (arguing that plea bargaining is an element “of a well-functioning 
market system”). 
10 See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
1037, 1107 (1984) (arguing that plea bargaining is not inevitable and that it should not 
be preferred to a bench trial). 
11 See generally George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857 (2000) 
(examining the development of plea bargaining into a dominant force in American 
criminal procedure). 
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This Article develops a “trial distortion” theory as one possible 
mid-level evaluation of plea negotiation practices in particular sys-
tems.  According to this theory, criminal courts in a jurisdiction pro-
duce too many dysfunctional guilty pleas when those guilty pleas dis-
tort the pattern of outcomes that would have resulted from trials.  A 
healthy system would aspire to replicate through its guilty pleas the 
same pattern of outcomes that trials would have produced.  Trial dis-
tortion theory calls attention to case outcomes rather than negotia-
tions in progress, and to patterns across cases rather than practices in 
a single case. 
Acquittals and dismissals play a starring role in the trial distortion 
story.  These are cases that might have resulted in a defendant’s free-
dom, and when a system starts to produce fewer acquittals and fewer 
dismissals, it triggers a warning light about the truth-finding function 
of the criminal justice system. 
In some systems, further inquiry might show that a drop in the ac-
quittal rate amounted to a false alarm, revealing no real basis for con-
cern.  According to a reassuring line of reasoning that I will call the 
“accuracy hypothesis,” fewer acquittals might simply reveal a system 
that produces increasingly accurate outcomes.  The accuracy might be 
achieved through a higher quality of cases entering the system, an im-
provement made possible when prosecutors make more time to 
screen more carefully the cases referred to them.  Perhaps law en-
forcement agents get better at collecting the evidence needed to win a 
case.  Similarly, downward trends in the acquittal rates might merely 
reflect better trial preparation and performance by prosecutors, or 
better negotiating skills among all the attorneys. 
In some other systems, however, a drop in the acquittal rate could 
point to very real problems with the quality of criminal justice.  Lower 
acquittal rates might show that prosecutors sell difficult cases too 
cheaply and only take easy cases to trial.  On the other hand, lower 
acquittal rates might indicate that defendants sell too cheaply, either 
because timid or underfunded defense attorneys cannot or will not 
challenge the prosecutor’s weakest cases, or (the most chilling possi-
bility) because the judge and the prosecutor threaten the defendant 
with too great a penalty for going to trial.12
12 In addition, a long-term drop in the rate of acquittals might become worrisome 
when acquittals no longer serve their market discipline function during plea negotia-
tions.  Acquittals at trials might become so rare that they cannot check abuses during 
bargaining.  See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. 
L. REV. 2463, 2470-76 (2004) (discussing the problematic incentives of prosecutors in 
plea negotiations that do not reflect expected trial outcomes); Gerard E. Lynch, Our 
84 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 79 
 
It is only possible to choose between these theoretical possibili-
ties—the trial distortion theory and the accuracy hypothesis—by ob-
serving particular criminal justice systems at work; accordingly, this 
Article interprets the patterns of guilty pleas and acquittals in the fed-
eral criminal justice system.13  Acquittals are steadily disappearing 
from the federal system.  Indeed, acquittals are disappearing more 
quickly than any other outcome, including trial convictions and dis-
missals, as guilty pleas expand to displace all other outcomes in fed-
eral court.  The drop in acquittals over the last thirty years flags some 
serious doubts about the quality of justice in the federal system to-
day.14
A close look at the system tells us that increasing accuracy proba-
bly does not explain this trend; unfortunately, the pattern has un-
folded because federal prosecutors have accumulated so much power 
under the sentencing laws that they can punish defendants too se-
verely for going to trial.  Federal law must respond to the current dis-
torting form of plea negotiations by restoring counterbalances to 
prosecutorial bargaining power and by limiting the techniques avail-
able to reward defendants for waiving their trials. 
Part I of this Article reviews the underappreciated history of guilty 
plea rates in the federal criminal justice system.  Surprisingly, federal 
guilty plea rates stayed flat during some periods and even declined 
significantly during the 1950s and 1960s.  After a relentless climb from 
the early 1970s to the present, however, the most recent numbers 
show the highest rates of guilty pleas in the history of federal criminal 
justice.  Part II documents how acquittal rates moved down whenever 
guilty plea rates went up.  In fact, since 1971 acquittal rates have 
dropped faster than other outcomes, such as dismissals or trial convic-
tions. 
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2146 (1998) 
(“[F]ully-adjudicated cases may be too rare to serve as a meaningful check on the ex-
ecutive authorities.”). 
13 To evaluate these patterns, I have compiled the relevant data in a web-based Sta-
tistical Appendix for this Article, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=809124 [here-
inafter Statistical Appendix].  Unless otherwise noted, the Statistical Appendix is the 
source for the data in this Article’s tables and figures. 
14 In 1975, Michael Finkelstein pursued this insight about the importance of ac-
quittals and dismissals in the evaluation of guilty pleas in a path-breaking statistical 
analysis of federal criminal justice.  Michael O. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty 
Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1975).  For a discussion of the 
intellectual debt I owe Finkelstein, and the limitations of his approach, see infra note 
74. 
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What explains the disappearance of acquittals in recent decades?  
In Part III we look for answers based in the history of federal criminal 
justice.  Shifts in the types of crimes charged explain some of the pat-
terns.  The strengthened presence of defense counsel accounts for the 
declining guilty plea rate in the 1950s and 1960s.  However, the most 
important cause of rising guilty pleas and falling acquittals in recent 
decades has been a dramatic increase in prosecutorial resources.  
Surprisingly, federal prosecutors today handle far fewer cases per at-
torney than they did in the middle of the twentieth century. 
Part IV pursues a deeper inquiry into federal plea practices, con-
centrating on more recent years.  Building on the premise that each 
of the ninety-four federal judicial districts employs its own plea prac-
tices with distinctive side effects, I analyze district-level statistics from 
1994 to the present to determine which environmental factors most 
strongly affect both guilty pleas and acquittals. 
This study points toward a symbiosis between plea practices and 
sentencing law.  The federal system over the last three decades has 
featured increasingly severe sentences, and the adoption of federal 
sentencing guidelines in the late 1980s enhanced the power of prose-
cutors and judges to reward cooperation from defendants.  In those 
districts where prosecutors took full advantage of the tools available to 
them under the sentencing laws, it became more expensive than ever 
for a federal defendant to insist on a trial; fewer paid the price each 
year. 
Two of the most important tools used to increase the plea dis-
count were “substantial assistance” departures that rewarded defen-
dants with lighter sentences for cooperating with the government to 
develop cases against other defendants,15 and “acceptance of respon-
sibility” adjustments to lighten the sentences of defendants who pled 
guilty early and gave the government full information about their 
crimes.16  The real power of these tools becomes clear when we notice 
that districts making heavy use of these techniques produced both 
higher guilty plea rates and lower acquittal rates.  In those districts, 
15 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2004) (“Upon motion of the 
government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the inves-
tigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court 
may depart from the guidelines.”). 
16 See id. § 3E1.1 (mandating the reduction of a defendant’s offense level “[i]f the 
defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense,” and un-
der some circumstances, if “the defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation 
or prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to 
enter a plea of guilty”). 
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the trial penalty—that is, the differential between the sentence after 
plea and sentence after trial—convinced more defendants to abandon 
worthwhile defenses.  In short, the combination of charging and sen-
tencing options gave federal prosecutors the power to distort trial 
outcomes. 
Having identified some features of the federal legal landscape that 
contribute to the most distorting plea negotiation practices, can we 
put these discoveries to work?  Is reform possible?  These questions 
achieved new urgency in early 2005, when the Supreme Court threw 
federal sentencing out of kilter with its decision in United States v. 
Booker.17  It was immediately clear that federal sentencing would never 
be the same after this case.  Congress began considering ways to repair 
the broken system, and key legislators pronounced this to be a mo-
ment for serious rethinking of the federal sentencing system.18
In this rare time of reflection and redesign, the effects of sentenc-
ing rules on plea negotiation practices should remain at the center of 
our attention.  When we judge plea negotiations by the patterns of 
outcomes they produce, they reveal the importance of two avenues for 
reform.  First, sentencing rules need to check the monopoly power of 
prosecutors over key sentencing discounts.  The judge needs credible 
authority to override prosecutorial decisions that punish defendants 
too severely when they insist on a trial.  Second, sentencing reforms 
must keep within tolerable bounds the penalty that a defendant must 
pay for going to trial, whether the prosecutor or the judge is the 
source of that penalty.  Sentencing reforms moving in these directions 
will both restore a balance of powers in federal criminal justice and 
improve the accuracy of the system.  Federal sentencing should be-
come more a servant of truth and less a slave to efficient case disposi-
tion. 
17 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005) (holding that any facts that increase the maximum 
available sentencing range must be found by the jury rather than the sentencing 
judge); see also Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536 (2004) (holding similarly 
to Booker, but with respect to state sentencing guidelines). 
18 See Posting of Douglas A. Berman to Sentencing Law and Policy, Panel 1 Sen-
tencing Hearing Highlights, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_ 
policy/2004/07/panel_1_senate_.html ( July 13, 2004, 11:53 AM) (describing the 
statements of senators in the hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee on “Blakely v. 
Washington and the Future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines”).  See generally Post-
ing of Douglas A. Berman to Sentencing Law and Policy, The House Hearing and Data 
Versus Anecdote in Sentencing Policy-Making, http://sentencing.typepad.com/ 
sentencing_law_and_policy/2005/02/data_versus_ane.html (Feb. 10, 2005, 12:58 PM) 
(describing the hearing of the House Judiciary Committee on “The Implications of the 
Booker/Fanfan Decisions for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines”). 
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I.  GUILTY PLEAS THAT RESOLVE CASES BUT NOT QUESTIONS 
High-quality criminal justice and guilty pleas can coexist under 
the right conditions.  Nevertheless, for over a century, lawyers and 
judges in the United States have treated “high” levels of guilty pleas as 
a cause for concern. 
The worries became more acute during times of change, when 
guilty pleas threatened to make the criminal trial disappear.  For in-
stance, in the 1920s, attorneys and academics studied criminal justice 
systems in many states and reported with alarm that criminal jury trials 
were vanishing.19  In many cities, the percentage of convictions ob-
tained from guilty pleas exceeded 70%—low figures by today’s stan-
dards, but jarring to attorneys at the time.20  Concern about the loss of 
criminal trials picked up again in the late 1960s and 1970s.21
Although higher guilty plea percentages captured the headlines, 
times of growth were not constants.  For example, we know that guilty 
pleas fell dramatically during several decades during the nineteenth 
century in Massachusetts.22  We know a lot about what sends guilty 
19 See, e.g., Alfred Bettman, Prosecution, in CLEVELAND FOUND., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
CLEVELAND 83, 95 tbl.3, 149, 181, 208 (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922) 
(discussing the reasons, which included the prevalence of guilty pleas, for fewer trials); 
HUGH N. FULLER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN VIRGINIA 79 tbl.39 (1931) (showing an increase 
in urban-jurisdiction guilty plea rates, out of those for whom guilt was established, 
from 50% in 1917 to 75% in 1927); C.E. Gehlke, Recorded Felonies:  An Analysis and Gen-
eral Survey, in ILL. ASS’N FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY 25, 42-46, 
72-86 (John H. Wigmore ed., 1929) (providing reasons for “trial court eliminations” 
and discussing the impact of plea bargaining thereon); see also Albert W. Alschuler, 
Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26-32 (1979) (discussing the crimi-
nal justice surveys of the 1920s). 
20 See Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 105 (1928) (show-
ing that, of twenty-four jurisdictions surveyed, only three showed that less than 70% of 
convictions were obtained through guilty pleas and five showed that at least 90% were 
so obtained). 
21 See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 19-20 (1966) 
(assessing the reasons for guilty pleas); DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION:  THE DE-
TERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 3 (Frank J. Remington ed., 
1966) (“Roughly 90 per cent of all criminal convictions are by pleas of guilty . . . .”); 
DALLIN H. OAKS & WARREN LEHMAN, A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT:  
A STUDY OF CHICAGO AND COOK COUNTY 59, 66 (1968) (providing tables illustrating 
guilty plea percentages in Chicago).  See generally Alschuler, supra note 19 (reviewing 
studies of guilty plea rates). 
22 Our most complete information about nineteenth-century plea rates (and about 
early guilty plea practices more generally) comes from George Fisher’s engaging his-
tory of the middle-tier criminal courts in Massachusetts.  GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BAR-
GAINING’S TRIUMPH:  A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003).  Fisher also 
offers some useful breakdowns among different types of crimes, with distinctive move-
ment in the rates for liquor sales crimes, murders, and other offenses.  See, e.g., id. at 35 
tbl.1.2 
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plea rates up, but we could also profit from asking what sends them 
sideways or down.  Just as we can draw lessons from particular places 
that operate with unusually low levels of negotiated guilty pleas,23 we 
can also learn much from concentrating on time periods when guilty 
plea rates decline.  Special attention to periods of declining rates 
might better explain the causes of, and predict the future of, guilty 
plea rates.  The federal system has seen both—times of boom and 
bust—in guilty pleas. 
If periods of increasing guilty pleas provoke questions about the 
quality of criminal justice, what answers have we found so far?  What 
qualifies as a rate that is “too high”?  The last section of this Part sur-
veys the misleading answers we give from analysis at the individual 
case level, and the truthful but paralyzing answers we give at the socie-
tal level. 
A.  Federal Guilty Plea Growth Spurts 
The federal courts handled federal crimes from the nation’s earli-
est years, but the number of criminal cases moving through the system 
each year remained quite small for several decades.  Nationwide statis-
tics about federal criminal enforcement first became available in a 
convenient form in 1871, after Congress required an annual report 
from the Attorney General.24  These reports collected figures for con-
victions, acquittals, dismissals, and jury trials, but in a telling omission, 
 There were also some remarkable stretches of stability for the rates in Connecti-
cut.  Milton Heumann’s study of the superior courts in Connecticut was one of the few 
efforts to track plea rates over many decades in the twentieth century.  Milton Heu-
mann, A Note on Plea Bargaining and Case Pressure, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 515 (1975).  The 
study confirmed stable trial rates from 1880 to 1954.  See id. at 520.  Heumann con-
structed this study as part of an effort to show that caseload does not drive guilty plea 
practices; he compared guilty plea rates in high-volume courts to those in low-volume 
courts, and compared guilty plea rates before and after a large decrease in court 
caseload (although he did not account for increased system resources to handle the 
additional cases).  See id. at 518-524. 
23 See generally Teresa White Carns & John Kruse, A Re-evaluation of Alaska’s Plea 
Bargaining Ban, 8 ALASKA L. REV. 27 (1991) (examining the continuing feasibility of 
Alaska’s ban on plea bargaining); Colin Loftin et al., Mandatory Sentencing and Firearms 
Violence:  Evaluating an Alternative to Gun Control, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 287 (1983) (ana-
lyzing Detroit’s prosecutorial ban on plea bargaining in firearms cases); Schulhofer, 
supra note 10 (studying the exceptionally low guilty plea rates in Philadelphia); Ronald 
Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29 (2002) 
(studying the effects of limits on charge bargains and sentence bargains in New Or-
leans from the 1970s through the 1990s). 
24 See Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 12, 16 Stat. 162, 164 (requiring the Attorney 
General to make an annual report including statistics on federal and state crimes), 
amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 238, § 1, 17 Stat. 578, 578. 
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they did not include information about guilty pleas until the 1908 re-
port.25
The reports depicted a growing system, although the expansion 
was uneven, as Table 1 shows.26  The earliest annual reports, from the 
decade of the 1870s, reported an average of 6,984 cases terminated in 
the federal criminal docket each year.  During the 1920s and early 
1930s, spurred by liquor prosecutions under the National Prohibition 
Act,27 the number of cases shot up from 26,476 in 1920 to 95,820 in 
1932, before dropping back to 38,667 in 1934,28 the year after the con-
stitutional basis for the Act was repealed.29
 
Table 1:  Average Annual Number of Defendants or Cases, 
Terminated in Federal Courts by Decades, 1871-200230
 
1871-1879   6,984  1940-1949 41,178 
1880-1889   9,181  1950-1959 37,366 
1890-1899 14,026  1960-1969 32,782 
1900-1909   8,713  1970-1979 46,619 
1910-1919 14,334  1980-1989 46,202 
1920-1929 58,326  1990-1999 61,364 
1930-1939 64,489  2000-2002 76,519 
 
25 See Finkelstein, supra note 14, at 301 (“Federal data for [guilty plea rates] are 
available in the Annual Reports of the Attorney General back to 1908.” (footnote omit-
ted)).  By 1940, the job of collecting and reporting the annual statistics on terminated 
criminal cases in the federal courts fell to the newly formed Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts (AOUSC).  See Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, sec. 1, § 304, 53 
Stat. 1223, 1223-24 (establishing the AOUSC and giving that office the duty to collect 
statistical data of the business transacted by the courts). 
26 See also Edward Rubin, A Statistical Study of Federal Criminal Prosecutions, 1 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 494, 496-508 (1934) (analyzing criminal prosecutions from 1922 un-
til 1933).  For more complete annual statistics, see the Statistical Appendix, supra note 
13.  Earlier compilations of federal criminal case disposition statistics appear in Finkel-
stein, supra note 14, apps. I, II, & III, and ALI, A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FED-
ERAL COURTS, pt. I, at 56-58 (1934). 
27 Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (repealed 1933) (restricting the use and 
manufacture of alcoholic beverages). 
28 See Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 1 (showing the number of convic-
tions, acquittals, and dismissals for each year). 
29 See United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 222-26 (1934) (holding that the 
National Prohibition Act was inoperative following the ratification of the Twenty-First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and that any prosecutions or appeals pending 
under that Act were to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). 
30 The figures from 1906, 1909, 1935, and 1942-1944 are not included in these av-
erages because the source data is either incorrect, unavailable, or in a different format.  
See Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at 4. 
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The number of defendants31 dropped modestly in the late 1940s 
and 1950s, partly a result of a decline in immigration cases.32  The 
number surged between 1970 and 1977 and then fell back temporarily 
from 1977 to 1980.  Finally, the system grew in almost every year from 
1980 to the present.33
Not surprisingly, the number of guilty pleas entered in federal 
court grew along with the system, but the overall proportion of guilty 
pleas also ballooned over the last twenty-five years.  Using a baseline of 
all adjudicated cases,34 guilty pleas trended downward from the 1950s 
through the 1970s before starting a sustained climb in 1980.  The ver-
tical line on Figure 1 marks the two distinct periods.35  By 2002, de-
fendants pleading guilty represented the largest share of adjudicated 
cases in the history of federal criminal justice, at 95.2%.36
 
31 Starting in 1936, the federal statistics calculate the number of defendants rather 
than the number of cases.  See ALI, supra note 26, at 27 (arguing that the difference 
between the two units of analysis is not very large in the federal system). 
32 Cf. Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at 13-14. 
33 See id. at app. 1.  Some of this growth is to be expected in a nation with a grow-
ing population.  In 1950, the federal courts terminated one criminal case for every 
3,580 people in the country; in 2000, the federal courts terminated one criminal case 
for every 4,760 people. 
34 For a discussion of the merits of adjudicated cases (guilty and nolo pleas, trial 
convictions, acquittals, and mistrials) as a base, and an alternative base of terminated 
cases (adjudicated cases plus dismissals), see the Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at 
4-5. 
35 The story from earlier years is interesting in its own right, but less pertinent for 
our immediate purposes.  The first prominent event in the story of guilty plea rates is 
the remarkable growth between 1910 (with a starting point of 67.1%) and 1933 (when 
the rate reached 91.1%).  A second phase, from 1935 to 1951, saw a brief drop to 
80.4% in 1941, and then a decade of increases, topping out at 90.3% in 1951.  See Sta-
tistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 1. 
36 That same year guilty pleas accounted for 96.2% of the federal convictions.  See 
Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 1 (showing 68,188 guilty pleas and 70,882 
convictions in 2002).  Reports from the Bureau of Justice Statistics have noted the in-
creased guilty plea rate in recent decades.  See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 197104, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 2001: WITH 
TRENDS 1982-2001, at 1 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ 
fccp01.pdf (“Almost all (95%) of those convicted in [2001 federal criminal cases] 
pleaded guilty or no contest.”). 
2005] TRIAL DISTORTION AND THE END OF INNOCENCE 91 
 
Figure 1:  Federal Guilty and Nolo Pleas in 
Adjudicated Cases, 1945-2002 (Percent) 
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These levels of change in the last quarter of the century carry seri-
ous consequences.  If plea rates were to fall back to 1980 levels and 
the total number of defendants remained the same, the number of 
federal trials (and all the resources needed to support them) would 
increase nearly ten-fold.37
The possible explanations for these high and low tides of guilty 
pleas must wait for Part III.  Before seeking out the causes of the 
changes, we must become acquainted with two ways to evaluate the 
growth of guilty pleas. 
B.  Plea Bargain Theories, Looking High and Low 
In an adversarial system of litigation, can true justice happen in 
the absence of trials?38  There was a time in the United States when 
judges in criminal cases answered this question with a clear-cut “no.”  
37 See Warren Burger, The State of the Judiciary—1970, 56 A.B.A. J. 929, 931 (1970) 
(noting that a small reduction in guilty pleas could have a large impact on the court 
system). 
38 Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (arguing that 
settlement poses serious problems for justice and should not be accepted as an alterna-
tive to trial); Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone?  Settlements, Nontrial Ad-
judications and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EM-
PIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 733 (2004) (suggesting that normative evaluation of the 
disappearance of civil trials depends on whether such trials are replaced by private set-
tlements or public, non-trial adjudication). 
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Some judicial opinions from the nineteenth century refused to coun-
tenance negotiated guilty pleas, and some even had qualms about 
guilty pleas entered without apparent negotiations between the prose-
cution and defense.39
And yet the answer to this question today, for those who work 
daily in courtrooms across the United States, is a troubled “yes.”  
Criminal justice experts—prosecutors, judges, and defense attor-
neys—assure us that plea bargains are necessary and create important 
public benefits,40 so the practice remains unpopular but stable.  The 
guilty plea rates are sky-high everywhere and have stayed high for dec-
ades, yet the sky never falls. 
Scholars have created theoretical accounts of guilty pleas on two 
different levels in response to this reality.  Some guilty plea theories 
evaluate plea negotiations on the micro-level, asking about the inten-
tions of the parties in each case.  Other theories pursue a macro-level 
approach, tracing the broad social effects of discounted sentences.  
This section will explain why neither level of analysis can help us di-
agnose problems with and improve plea practices. 
1.  Micro-Level Intentions 
One of the important differences among guilty plea theories is the 
type of information they use for evaluation.  Some accounts of guilty 
pleas look to the intentions of individual actors in each case.  These 
tests fail, however, because they turn on information that is not rou-
tinely available. 
The standard legal test for the validity of guilty pleas rests on a mi-
cro-level inquiry, asking whether the defendant in a particular case 
“knowingly and voluntarily” waived the right to trial.41  Courts and 
39 See Edwards v. People, 39 Mich. 760, 763 (1878) (requiring the trial judge to 
examine the defendant, out of the presence of the prosecutor, about his reasons for 
pleading guilty, to prevent abuses of prosecutorial power); Commonwealth v. Battis, 1 
Mass. 95, 95-96 (1804) (demanding extreme caution in the acceptance of guilty pleas 
entered in capital cases). 
40 See Barnett E. Hoffman, Letter to the Editor, Courts Would Stall Without Plea Bar-
gains, HOME NEWS TRIB. (East Brunswick, N.J.), Jan. 9, 2004, at A10 (arguing that, 
given the extremely high ratio of indictments to judges, plea bargaining is a practical 
necessity). 
41 See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (“[T]he Constitution 
insists . . . that the defendant enter a guilty plea that is ‘voluntary’ and that the defen-
dant must make related waivers ‘knowing[ly], intelligent[ly], [and] with sufficient 
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’” (brackets in origi-
nal) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970))).  See generally MARC L. 
MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES:  CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECU-
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procedural rules set up easily achieved requirements for demonstrat-
ing knowledge:  the defendant must know some specifics about the 
charges filed, the most important procedural rights available at trial, 
and at least some of the consequences of a conviction.42  The defen-
dant in a serious case must also have competent legal counsel to ex-
plain this information before pleading guilty.43  But when it comes to 
the defendant’s “voluntariness”—the second half of the formula—
courts have walked away.  The proper knowledge, together with a pro 
forma statement from the defendant that her guilty plea was not co-
erced, normally suffices. 
Consider some of the coercive environments that are said to pro-
duce “voluntary” guilty pleas according to this standard.  The size of 
the differential between the post-trial sentence and the post-plea sen-
tence can become enormous.  When a defendant faces a possible life 
sentence after conviction at trial and the prosecutor offers to reduce 
charges, making possible a sentence of only a few years, the resulting 
guilty plea is considered voluntary so long as the defendant says the 
magic words at the guilty plea hearing.44  The strength of the defen-
dant’s available defense does not figure at all.  The government’s evi-
dence gets only the most perfunctory testing when the prosecutor 
TIVE MATERIALS 1037-58 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing knowledge, voluntariness, and an 
adequate factual basis to support the charges as the “three essential ingredients for a 
valid plea of guilty”). 
42 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (directing courts, before accepting a guilty plea, to 
ensure that the defendant understands the rights she waives, that the plea was entered 
into voluntarily, and that there is a factual basis for the plea); Henderson v. Morgan, 
426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976) (holding that a guilty plea is not voluntary unless the defen-
dant receives “real notice of the true nature of the charge against him” (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (re-
quiring that a defendant entering a guilty plea understand that she waives her right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, her right to trial by jury, and her right to con-
front her accusers); State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1238-39 (N.J. 2003) (concluding 
that, before accepting a defendant’s plea, a court must ensure that the defendant un-
derstands the possibility of indefinite future civil commitment under the Sexually Vio-
lent Predator Act that may result from the plea).  But cf. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629-33 (allow-
ing the entry of a guilty plea despite the plea agreement’s limitations on prosecutorial 
disclosure of “material impeachment evidence”). 
43 See Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161 (1957) (holding that a defendant in a 
murder case had a constitutional right to counsel before entering a guilty plea). 
44 For an account of an exceptional case in which the trial judge did not accept a 
plea of guilty despite the proper catechism responses from the defendant, see Associ-
ated Press, Judge Nixes Guilty Plea in AOL Spam Case, Dec. 21, 2004, http://i.abcnews. 
com/Business/wireStory?id=350717 (reporting that Judge Alvin Hellerstein refused to 
accept a guilty plea from AOL software engineer Jason Smathers because the judge was 
not convinced that Smathers had committed a crime under the new federal “can-
spam” legislation). 
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orally summarizes, in a few moments at the guilty plea hearing, the 
“factual basis” of the government’s case.45
A defendant can enter a “voluntary” plea even while maintaining 
her innocence; such Alford pleas are said to express the defendant’s 
voluntary acknowledgement that the government’s evidence is too 
strong.46  Even if the judge who will preside at trial and pronounce the 
sentence urges the defendant to accept a plea offer rather than going 
to trial, in many jurisdictions such a guilty plea is considered volun-
tary.47
This legal doctrine grows out of a contractual view of plea bargain-
ing.  In their purest form, contractual theories evaluate plea negotia-
tions on the same grounds used to evaluate private contract negotia-
tions.  For each case, individual negotiators are presumed to act in 
their own best interests.  The presumption is strong, and perhaps ir-
rebuttable:  only the parties know their own interests and any system-
wide effort to second-guess the outcomes negotiated by willing buyers 
and sellers would be folly.48
These theories treat the potential results at trial as an imperfect 
measure of what really happened at the scene of the crime; the nego-
tiating parties themselves will have more complete information on this 
score, without interference from rules of evidence and other artifacts 
45 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3) (requiring the court to find some factual basis for 
the plea).  The guilty plea can be declared knowing and voluntary even if the judge 
accepts the guilty plea but does not accept the plea agreement that induced the de-
fendant to plead guilty.  See United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 671 (1997) (holding 
that a defendant could not withdraw his plea after the district court had accepted the 
plea but deferred the decision on whether to accept the plea agreement); Julian A. 
Cook, III, All Aboard!  The Supreme Court, Guilty Pleas, and the Railroading of Criminal De-
fendants, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 863, 863-68 (2004) (examining the rules allowing for the 
acceptance of a guilty plea without acceptance of the plea agreement). 
46 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970) (holding that a guilty 
plea could be entered despite the defendant’s belief in his innocence when the State 
demonstrated a strong factual basis for the plea). 
47 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-12-211 (2005) (allowing the court to advise the de-
fendant regarding whether it will accept a proposed guilty plea and to afford the de-
fendant an opportunity to withdraw that plea); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1021(a) (2005) 
(allowing the trial judge to participate in plea discussions); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 402(d) 
(permitting the trial judge to opine when parties propose a plea deal); State v. Warner, 
762 So. 2d 507, 514 (Fla. 2000) (finding that a court may comment on a plea deal pro-
posed by the parties).  Only explicit browbeating from the trial judge will lead to a 
finding that a “knowing” plea was nevertheless “involuntary.”  See, e.g., State v. Bouie, 
817 So. 2d 48, 54-55 (La. 2002) (finding a plea to be involuntary when entered only 
after repeated statements by the trial judge that acquittal was unlikely and that the sen-
tence differential between a plea and a trial would be at least twenty years). 
48 See Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 308-322 (discussing the desirability of plea bar-
gaining from a market perspective). 
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of courtroom proof.49  Thus, the match between potential trial results 
and actual negotiation results is not relevant to the quality of the 
guilty plea.50
Variations on the case-level contractual view of plea bargains—we 
might label them “motive” theories—focus on the personal motives of 
prosecutors.  They attempt to identify recurring biases in the decisions 
of prosecutors about whether to accept a proposed plea bargain. 
Too often, however, motive theories produce contradictory ac-
counts.  One might theorize, based on an economic model of rational 
behavior, that prosecutors try too few cases because they would rather 
spend time golfing or pursuing some other leisure.51  Or one might 
argue that prosecutors try too many cases because they want to develop 
their trial skills and make themselves more attractive to private firms 
offering large salaries.52  These theories are indeterminate because the 
49 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 
1970-71 (1992) (arguing that negotiations between sophisticated persons unencum-
bered by the rules of evidence produces more accurate results than trials produce). 
50 Contractual theories also take more nuanced forms.  Robert Scott and William 
Stuntz concede the defendant’s voluntariness for most cases, but identify some excep-
tional settings where a fully informed (and innocent) defendant might enter an invol-
untary guilty plea.  See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 
101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1957-66 (1992) (examining the problem of incompetent defense 
lawyering and situations where great disparity exists between a post-trial sentence and a 
plea sentence).  The Scott-Stuntz approach shares some features with trial distortion 
theory.  Like trial distortion theory, Scott and Stuntz measure the legitimacy of plea 
bargains by their ability to produce accurate convictions.  However, they promote rules 
that make it easier for prosecutors to offer large discounts to defendants in weaker 
cases and reject efforts to evaluate plea bargains based on the outcomes they produce. 
51 Cf. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 43, 50-51 (1988) (noting that prosecutors are influenced by day-to-day 
motivations that may rank higher than maximizing deterrence).  Similarly, one might 
theorize on the basis of sociological insights about “working groups” that prosecutors 
try too few cases because they put too great a value on stable and non-adversarial rela-
tionships with judges and defense attorneys.  See, e.g., JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT 
JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE:  AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS 27-28, 32-
34 (1977) (describing how working-group dynamics strive to maintain cohesion and 
reduce conflict within the courtroom); HENRY R. GLICK, COURTS, POLITICS, AND JUS-
TICE 234 (3d ed. 1993) (positing that close interactions within courtroom working 
groups encourage plea bargain settlements). 
52 See Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize?  An Analysis of the Fed-
eralization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259, 288 (2000) (arguing that the deci-
sion to take cases to trial in the federal system is based partly on the desire of prosecu-
tors to develop human capital in trials); Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Abstract, 
The Sources of Agency:  An Empirical Examination of United States Attorneys (1999), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=200508 (“[P]rosecutors may take cases to trial to 
acquire human capital unless they are closely monitored.”). 
 As a matter of game theory, it is possible that prosecutors would go to trial more 
often in their weakest cases, but a shift in a few working assumptions leads to the oppo-
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incentives at work on prosecutors and other actors in individual cases 
point in different directions.  The motive theories also concentrate on 
a secondary level of social problems by promoting efficiency rather 
than accuracy in criminal justice.  The most compelling reason to try 
more criminal cases is not to encourage an honest day’s work from 
public servants.  It is to promote the central reason behind the crimi-
nal trial:  to sort the innocent from the guilty.53
We need an alternative theory of guilty pleas, one that transcends 
the hidden intentions and grudgingly spoken words of defendants 
and the contradictory incentives at work on prosecutors in particular 
cases.  An external evaluation of guilty pleas is necessary because none 
of the negotiating parties will reliably protect the public interest.  The 
prosecutor, as an agent of the public, will not necessarily follow the 
wishes of the principal.  Defense lawyers might also be viewed as 
agents of the public, assigned the duty of assuring accurate and ac-
countable adjudications of crime.  But lack of funding and other ob-
stacles may lead defense attorneys to fall short in these public duties.54
site result:  prosecutors will go to trial in their strongest cases.  See Scott Baker & Clau-
dio Mezzetti, Prosecutorial Resources, Plea Bargaining, and the Decision To Go to Trial, 17 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 149, 162-66 (2001) (concluding that prosecutors will only go to trial 
when they think they have a strong chance of success); Gene M. Grossman & Michael 
L. Katz, Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 749 (1983) (describing 
the motivation of prosecutors to go to trial only where a guilty outcome is appropri-
ate); Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. 
REV. 713, 713-28 (1988) (discussing the strength of a prosecutor’s case as a key ele-
ment in the decision to offer a plea bargain). 
53 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  FIRST 
PRINCIPLES 154-55 (1997) (positing a truth-finding function as a central constitutional 
value of criminal procedure); WILLIAM PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH:  WHY OUR SYS-
TEM OF CRIMINAL TRIALS HAS BECOME AN EXPENSIVE FAILURE AND WHAT WE NEED TO 
DO TO REBUILD IT passim (1999) (criticizing U.S. criminal procedure for placing insuf-
ficient value on the trial’s truth-finding function); Christopher A. Bracey, Book Review, 
Truth and Legitimacy in the American Criminal Process, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 
698-99 (2000) (arguing that the truth-finding capacity of police, prosecutors, and 
courts is central to the public legitimacy of criminal justice). 
54 See AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, 
GIDEON ’ S BROKEN PROMISE:  AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 7-13 
(2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/ 
fullreport.pdf (finding that many defendants are represented by lawyers who are with-
out adequate resources to provide effective representation); Albert W. Alschuler, The 
Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1206-55 (1975) (discussing 
the limits and the pressures put upon public defenders in plea bargaining); Ronald F. 
Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA 
L. REV. 219, 221-25 (2004) (discussing the relative lack of resources provided to public 
defenders and potential sources for remedy). 
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Thus, there are public interests at stake in plea negotiations that 
both parties at the table might ignore.55  The public’s interests in plea 
discounts of the right scope can be protected best in a process that is 
open to public scrutiny and accountability.56  Outsiders must be able 
to estimate, based on the likely views of judges and juries who evaluate 
admissible evidence, what would have occurred at trial and use that 
estimate to test the predictions or calculations of the parties. 
It may be impractical to make such judgments in individual cases, 
for that would require access to all the witnesses and evidence that 
might play out at trial.  But the insistence that the parties do not al-
ways know best—central to a trial distortion theory—gets stronger 
when observers review outcomes in many cases across time.57  Patterns 
in outcomes can signal potentially distorting plea negotiation prac-
tices, even if the reliability of evidence from case to case is unknow-
able.  Whatever the words that defendants utter at the plea hearings, a 
system should not tolerate plea bargaining practices that distort the 
outcomes that would have occurred at trial. 
2.  Macro-Level Social Purposes 
Other approaches to guilty pleas move outside the minds of the 
negotiating parties—and outside the criminal courtroom altogether—
to ask whether guilty pleas serve larger social purposes.  Some writers 
in this vein conclude that they do, while others judge plea bargains a 
failure and call for their abolition.  Despite their disparate vantage 
points, these perspectives on plea bargaining share common ground:  
they discuss plea bargaining as a social institution that must stand or 
fall as a whole. 
Crime control plays a leading role among the relevant social pur-
poses that plea bargaining can serve.  Under this approach, plea nego-
tiations succeed if they extend the power of government to punish 
55 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1985-90 
(1992) (arguing that both prosecutors and defenders may fail to internalize serious 
issues of public interest in their plea negotiations); Easterbrook, supra note 49, at 1970 
(noting that prosecutors and defense attorneys often agree to plea negotiations be-
cause they believe all defendants are guilty). 
56 See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1410-12 (2003) (arguing in favor of greater transparency in plea 
bargaining). 
57 For an influential exploration of the conditions that make the parties less than 
trustworthy in evaluating plea bargains, see Bibas, supra note 12, at 2470-82 (discussing 
the troublesome incentives of prosecutors and defense attorneys entering plea nego-
tiations). 
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(and therefore to control) crime.58  Economic models of plea bargain-
ing urge prosecutors to obtain as much criminal punishment as possi-
ble within a limited office budget.59  Social cohesion is another public 
purpose used to evaluate guilty pleas.  Some social historians posit that 
plea bargaining allows elite social classes to soften the enforcement of 
a criminal law that falls heavily on the lower social orders, and that it 
thereby reduces social conflict.60
Legal scholars who criticize plea bargains answer these claims on 
several levels.  First, they dispute the factual claims about the degree 
of crime control or social cohesion believed to flow from plea bar-
gains.61  And on a normative level, abolitionists give central impor-
58 Cf. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:  An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169, 176-79 (1968) (arguing that criminal law procedures that increase convic-
tion rates make crime less economically beneficial, thereby reducing the incentive to 
engage in criminal offenses); Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 289 (arguing that plea bar-
gaining is one of several elements of the criminal justice system that set the “price” of 
crime); Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121, 1135-
49 (1998) (discussing the taxonomy of just results theories and resource/efficiency 
theories).  In Zacharias’s scheme, trial distortion theory would be considered a “just 
results” theory.  See id. at 1135-44 (describing the premises and justifications of “just 
results” theories). 
59 See William Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 63-64 
(1971) (noting that prosecutors must work within their offices’ budgetary constraints 
to maximize the number of convictions and their resulting sentences); Jennifer F. Re-
inganum, Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion and Plea Bargaining, 31 RAND J. ECON. 
62, 69 (2000) (treating a prosecutor’s objective as maximizing prison sentences while 
minimizing the cost of prosecution).  Prosecutors themselves care more about accu-
racy and less about maximum coverage than economic theory suggests.  See DAVID T. 
JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE:  PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN 97-98 & tbl.3.1 
(2002) (describing survey responses of American and Japanese prosecutors); Brian 
Forst & Kathleen B. Brosi, A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Prosecutor, 6 J. LEG. 
STUD. 177, 178-79 (1977) (arguing that prosecutors, to obtain greater crime-rate re-
ductions, choose to focus their resources on cases involving recidivists rather than on 
those involving first-time offenders); cf. Alissa Pollitz Worden, Policymaking by Prosecu-
tors:  The Uses of Discretion in Regulating Plea Bargaining, 73 JUDICATURE 335, 340 (1990) 
(concluding from statistical data that prosecutors are more concerned with ensuring 
due process than maximizing conviction rates). 
60 See Mary E. Vogel, The Social Origins of Plea Bargaining:  Conflict and the Law in the 
Process of State Formation, 1830-1860, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 161, 235-37 (1999) (arguing 
that plea bargaining was developed in part as an effort by the courts to include mem-
bers of the lower social orders in the political system and to thus give them a better 
opportunity for citizenship).  For persuasive critiques of Vogel’s account, see FISHER, 
supra note 22, at 11 (arguing that plea bargaining should be understood as a legal, not 
social, phenomenon); Stephanos Bibas, Pleas’ Progress, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1024, 1030 
(2004) (reviewing FISHER, supra note 22). 
61 See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial:  Alter-
natives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 940 (1983) (citing the re-
duced duration of felony cases following the imposition of Alaska’s ban on plea bar-
gaining as evidence that the practice does not save resources); Schulhofer, supra note 
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tance to lawyerly process values:  even weighty social ends do not jus-
tify sordid procedural means.62  In utilitarian terms, it is corrosive to 
ignore the question of public confidence in the quality of criminal 
case outcomes. 
Both the positive social purpose theories and the abolitionist cri-
tiques analyze plea bargains at a high level of abstraction. The theories 
address plea bargaining as a social institution, with similar effects for 
good or for ill wherever it goes.  Discussion at the macro level, how-
ever, has proven useless in viable legal reform efforts, for its all-or-
nothing reform agenda is dispiriting in a world where plea bargaining 
is so entrenched.63  Instead, we need a mid-level theory—something 
between the accounts focused on the individual-case level and the so-
cial-institution level—that evaluates plea bargaining as an artifact of a 
particular criminal justice system, with different features from place to 
place. 
A mid-level theory would offer two sorts of advantages over the 
micro- and social-level accounts of plea bargaining.  First, as an admin-
istrative matter, the social-purpose theories rely on evidence that is 
difficult to obtain.  To evaluate guilty pleas under a social-purpose 
theory, we must estimate whether a society might experience more 
crime or more social conflict if the law discouraged or barred certain 
plea negotiations.  Instead, a mid-level theory would direct us to acces-
sible sources when judging the quality of plea negotiation practices.64  
Such a theory would require us to examine the patterns of procedural 
outcomes across the system as a whole, rather than the intentions of 
the parties in particular cases or the larger social ends that guilty pleas 
might achieve.  In short, a mid-level theory would depend on the types 
of evidence that working criminal justice professionals already rou-
tinely collect, and it asks professionals and scholars to make judg-
ments they are competent to make. 
55, at 1988 (arguing that any crime-control benefits derived from plea bargaining may 
be undermined by competing economic pressures on assistant prosecutors). 
62 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652, 
671-77 (1981) (arguing that it is morally impermissible in Kantian terms to balance 
virtues of trials against economic costs of trials). 
63 See Fisher, supra note 11, at 1067-75 (discussing how plea bargaining has be-
come entrenched despite the existence of alternative mechanisms of criminal case 
resolution). 
64 George Fisher presents the account of plea bargaining that most closely resem-
bles the mid-level theory I elaborate here.  Fisher rejects the social-purpose theories 
and constructs an historical account of plea bargaining that looks to the evidence 
available from courtroom practices.  See  id. at 893-936. 
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The second advantage of a mid-level theory is its ability to respond 
to meaningful differences among types of guilty plea practices.  Public 
attitudes reflect this divided reality,65 and fundamentals of human psy-
chology suggest that some plea bargains are worse than others.66  We 
now turn to one possible mid-level indicator of troublesome negotiat-
ing practices:  the number of acquittals in a jurisdiction. 
II.  ACQUITTALS AS A WARNING 
Look around the globe, and you will find criminal justice systems 
where extremely low rates of acquittals reveal profound trouble.67  In 
the courts of the former Soviet Union, for example, acquittal rates 
remained extremely low, largely because the judges knew that acquit-
tals threatened their career advancement.68  Soviet judges could not 
afford to take very seriously the truth-finding function of criminal ad-
judication.  On the other hand, remarkably low acquittal rates in 
other countries inspire more confidence.  The Japanese courts acquit 
65 See Sergio Herzog, The Relationship Between Public Perceptions of Crime Seriousness 
and Support for Plea-Bargaining Practices in Israel:  A Factorial-Survey Approach, 94 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 103, 127-28 (2003) (finding that public disapproval of plea bargain-
ing is stronger for more serious offenses). 
66 See generally Bibas, supra note 12 (applying a structural-psychological perspective 
to the analysis of plea bargaining and the influence of party incentives). 
67 The differences in acquittal rates correlate with differences in guilty plea nego-
tiation practices.  Today, most countries with a civil law tradition do allow some form 
of negotiation between the parties in criminal matters, but these countries are still less 
hospitable to guilty plea negotiations than we are in the United States.  See JOHNSON, 
supra note 59, at 246 (noting that guilty pleas are not formally recognized in Japan and 
that most cases are instead based on “confessions”); Richard S. Frase & Thomas Wei-
gend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform:  Similar Problems, Better 
Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 344-46 (1995) (noting that while Ger-
many does not explicitly allow plea bargaining, analogues of plea negotiations do take 
place); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System:  Lessons from 
Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 208 
(2004) (arguing that a comparison of the roles of American federal prosecutors and 
their European counterparts in investigating, charging, and sentencing confirms that 
our present system has “a decidedly administrative cast,” giving federal prosecutors all 
the powers of inquisitorial prosecutors without the formal and informal limits on that 
power). 
68 See Peter H. Solomon, Jr., The Case of the Vanishing Acquittal:  Informal Norms and 
the Practice of Soviet Criminal Justice, 39 SOVIET STUD. 531, 536-38 (1987) (positing that 
low acquittal rates from judges in the Soviet Union resulted from pressure from politi-
cal parties that controlled nomination for judicial reelection and from oversight by 
superiors). 
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very few defendants, yet the review and resources devoted to each case 
make the system a potentially positive model.69
Such divergent lessons about acquittals also play out in the United 
States.  Low acquittal rates in some jurisdictions might reflect a tragic 
indifference to the truth and the prosecutors’ determination above all 
to secure convictions.  Conversely, low acquittal rates might bring 
positive news of prosecutors who select and prepare cases with great 
care, defense attorneys who have enough time and resources to de-
velop the best available defense, and sentencing judges who offer only 
a modest benefit for pleading guilty. 
So a significant drop in acquittal rates is an important event in a 
criminal justice system, but it is ambiguous when it comes to the truth-
finding function of the law.  Lower acquittal rates should serve only as 
a warning light, a reason to examine a system more closely for other 
signs that the environment is compromising reliable outcomes.  On 
this score, the federal system reveals a point of genuine concern, be-
cause for the last twenty-five years acquittals have dropped faster than 
dismissals or trial convictions. 
A.  Federal Acquittal Rates and the Guilty Plea Connection 
It is no surprise that when guilty plea rates rise, acquittal rates fall, 
and vice versa.  Figure 2 shows the long-term trends for acquittals in 
the federal system. 
 
69 Acquittals in Japan remain low, perhaps, because the prosecutors have the time 
and incentive to screen out their weakest cases.  See JOHNSON, supra note 59, ch. 7 (ar-
guing that the low acquittal levels in Japan arise in part from the combination of a 
“conservative charging policy” and the ability of Japanese prosecutors to investigate 
cases more thoroughly before charging a defendant); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Ras-
musen, Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 53 (2001) 
(“[T]he high conviction rates [in Japan] reflect case selection and low prosecutorial 
budgets; understaffed prosecutors present judges with only the most obviously guilty 
defendants.”).  But see Hiroshi Matsubara, Trial by Prosecutor, LEGAL AFF., Mar.-Apr. 
2003, at 11, 11-12 (arguing that Japan’s high conviction rate reflects procedural injus-
tice).  For a discussion of acquittal and guilty plea rates in another common law system, 
see Michael Zander, What the Annual Statistics Tell Us About Pleas and Acquittals, 1991 
CRIM. L. REV. 252, 252 (noting that pleas in Great Britain went up in the 1980s from 
62% to 72% of defendants, but acquittal rates stayed flat). 
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Figure 2:  Federal Acquittals and Mistrials in 
Adjudicated Cases, 1945-2002 (Percent)70
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 During the two decades from 1951 through 1971, acquittal rates 
rose to their highest post-World War II levels, up from 2.3% in 1951 to 
5.5% in 1971.  The years since 1971 brought acquittal rates down to 
the lowest level in the history of the federal criminal justice system:  
1% in 2002.71  The declines since 1989 have been particularly steep. 
70 The statistics supporting this figure, which are compiled in the Statistical Ap-
pendix, supra note 13, at app. 1, derive from the AOUSC.  See Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics, Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center (2003), http://f jsrc.urban.org/ 
noframe/download.cfm (follow the “Download Data” hyperlink; then the “Standard 
Analysis Files” hyperlink; then the hyperlink for the dataset desired; and then apply the 
recommended compression software to obtain data in a form suitable for processing 
by statistical management software, such as SPSS or SAS).  The AOUSC defines “ac-
quittals” to include acquittals, mistrials, or verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity.  
In cases of multiple counts charged against a single defendant in a case, the outcome 
of the most serious charged offense is used to classify the case.  Thus, a defendant who 
obtains an acquittal on the most serious count and convictions on lesser counts would 
be classified as an acquittal. 
 The vertical line on Figure 2 marks the point at which guilty pleas began a sus-
tained climb in 1980.  See Figure 1. 
71 Earlier periods also saw interesting interactions between guilty pleas and acquit-
tals.  Between 1910 and 1933, as guilty plea rates climbed, the acquittal rates fell more 
severely than at any other time in the century—from nearly 15% to 1.9%—continuing 
a long-term slide from highs of almost 24% in the 1890s.  Between 1934 and 1951, 
while the guilty plea rates fell and then rose, the acquittal rates rose and then fell.  See 
Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 1. 
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Although the acquittal rates show an intuitive connection with 
guilty plea rates (acquittal rates go down when guilty plea rates go 
up), a closer look reveals a more important and subtle feature of the 
relationship:  comparably high guilty plea rates do not always produce 
equally low acquittal rates.  The years 1951 and 2002 produced two of 
the higher points in guilty plea percentages, with roughly the same 
rates in both years (at 90.3% and 95.2%, respectively).  Yet those same 
years did not generate equally low acquittals:  The acquittal rate for 
1951 (2.3%) was over twice as high as the rate in 2002 (1%).72  Put in 
terms of a ratio, guilty pleas outnumbered acquittals 40 to 1 in 1951, 
and 93 to 1 in 2002, making the imbalance of recent years the most 
extreme in the history of federal criminal justice. 
Even though acquittals tend to go down when guilty pleas go up, it 
is not true that higher guilty plea rates cause lower acquittal rates.  
Rather, certain plea negotiation practices cause the changes in both 
of these dispositions.  Those times and places where the ratio between 
guilty pleas and acquittals reach their highest point deserve the closest 
scrutiny, for there we find the greatest risk that plea negotiations are 
distorting the outcomes that would happen at trial. 
B.  Acquittals and the Other Displaced Outcomes 
So far I have treated acquittal rates and guilty plea rates as a bilat-
eral relationship, when in fact the relationship is multilateral.  Guilty 
plea rates change alongside acquittals, but they also change along with 
trial convictions, dismissals by judges, and dismissals by prosecutors. 
As slices of the disposition pie, acquittals, dismissals, and trial con-
victions all tend to shrink as the guilty plea slice grows larger, but the 
amount that each shrinks is not preordained.  It is possible that guilty 
plea negotiations could affect all of the alternatives equally.73  But it is 
 Bench trial acquittal rates increased from 1982 to 2001 across all crime types.  See 
Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 5; cf. Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal 
Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 151, 164 fig.3, 166 & fig.5 (2005) (charting 
the federal bench trial conviction rates since 1946).  On the other hand, from 1946 to 
the early 1960s, judges had higher conviction rates than juries.  See Leipold, supra, at 
164 fig.3. 
72 See Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 1. 
73 For instance, imagine that a guilty plea rate of 70% occurs in Year 1 alongside 
20% dismissals, 7% trial convictions, and 3% acquittals.  If that guilty plea rate rises to 
75% in Year 2, and simultaneously moves the dismissals down to 16.7%, the trial con-
victions to 5.8%, and the acquittals to 2.5%, then the growth in guilty pleas reduces 
each of the alternatives in equal proportions.  That is, the mix among the non-plea 
outcomes remains the same; in both Year 1 and Year 2, acquittals account for 10% of 
the non-plea outcomes (3 of 30 in Year 1 and 2.5 of 25 in Year 2). 
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also possible that guilty pleas could displace acquittals at a faster rate 
than the other non-plea outcomes, and change the mix over time.  As 
Figures 3 and 4 show, the acquittal slice of the pie in the federal sys-
tem has been shrinking more quickly than the slices for dismissals or 
trial convictions.  Acquittals now occupy a smaller portion of the non-
plea outcomes than at any time since the repeal of Prohibition. 
Figure 3 tracks the relationship between acquittals on the one 
hand and dismissals on the other, expressed as a ratio of dismissals to 
acquittals.  Larger numbers (higher points on the vertical axis) denote 
a weakening of acquittals compared to dismissals.  As the upward 
movement of the graph shows, acquittals have lost ground to trial con-
victions and dismissals since the 1950s.  Just before the rate of guilty 
pleas bottomed out in the 1970s, dismissals gained ground on acquit-
tals and the graph line moved up more steeply.  The most recent dec-
ade brought the highest ratios of dismissals to acquittals. 
 
Figure 3:  Ratio of Dismissals to Acquittals 
in Federal Court, 1950-2002 
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Figure 4:  Ratio of Trial Convictions to Acquittals 
in Federal Court, 1950-2002 
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Figure 4 gives us a separate picture of the acquittal-trial conviction 
relationship.  The graph line here also runs in a telling direction.  
During the 1950s and 1960s, when guilty pleas were decreasing, ac-
quittals gained ground on trial convictions.  In recent decades, as 
guilty pleas increased, trial convictions became more common than 
acquittals and the graph line shifted higher.74
74 Because dismissals and acquittals both result in non-conviction (and freedom) 
for a defendant, one additional relationship among the outcomes merits attention:  
the changing ratio of dismissals and acquittals on the one hand to trial convictions on 
the other.  A figure illustrating this relationship over time appears in the Statistical 
Appendix, supra note 13, at 6. 
 The relationship between acquittals and dismissals was the center of attention in 
Finkelstein’s 1975 analysis, supra note 14.  He labeled the difference between the aver-
age acquittal and dismissal rate and a particular district’s acquittal and dismissal rate as 
the “implicit non-conviction” rate, id. at 295-98, arguing that districts with below-
average non-conviction rates would likely produce extra acquittals and dismissals if 
those districts had a lower guilty plea rate.  See id. at 304-09.  This article was based on 
an ingenious insight, and tracked federal criminal justice outcomes more thoroughly 
than any study had done since the American Law Institute study in the 1930s.  See ALI, 
supra note 26 (studying criminal cases in thirteen federal district courts over a period 
of three years). 
 While the idea is useful, Finkelstein’s analysis remains incomplete for purposes of 
evaluating plea bargain practices.  First, he did not explore in any detail the different 
possible causes of below-average acquittal and dismissal rates.  He used a two-variable 
regression, tracking correlations between acquittals and guilty pleas without attempt-
ing to measure other differences among districts.  Second, Finkelstein combined trial 
convictions and guilty pleas rather than independently tracking their interaction with 
acquittals and dismissals.  This combination obscures the impact of guilty pleas across 
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Overall, the increased prevalence of guilty pleas since the 1980s 
spells danger for federal criminal justice.  Guilty plea negotiations 
have crowded out other alternatives, taking the heaviest toll on acquit-
tals. 
C.  The Mid-Level Trial Distortion Theory 
Up to this point in the Article, only a quick outline of the trial dis-
tortion theory was necessary as background to our review of guilty plea 
rates and other dispositions in the federal system.  More detail is now 
required, however, as we sort through the possible meanings one 
might attach to high guilty plea and low acquittal rates. 
Trial distortion theory walks a path between the micro- and 
macro-level accounts of guilty pleas.  It differs from micro-level meth-
ods of evaluating guilty pleas because it examines patterns across 
many cases rather than reconstructing evidence and events in particu-
lar cases.75  It differs from macro-level methods because it remains fo-
cused on courtroom results rather than crime control, social cohe-
sion, or other broad-based social effects.  This path between the 
micro- and the macro-levels uses information readily at hand to create 
a targeted critique of plea practices. 
Ideally, under trial distortion theory, extra guilty pleas should 
produce the same mix of convictions and non-convictions that a sys-
tem would produce if every filed case either went to trial or was dis-
missed.76  Every person who holds a genuine factual or legal defense 
to the crime as charged should either be acquitted at trial or leave the 
system when the prosecutor decides not to file the charge or when the 
prosecutor or judge dismisses the charge.  Because such a person 
should not be convicted at trial, that defendant likewise should not 
all the alternative outcomes.  Third, Finkelstein did not use the diagnostic tool he pio-
neered to find particular plea practices to regulate.  Instead, he treated the presence 
of “implicit non-convictions” as a basis for outright abolition of guilty pleas.  Fourth, 
combining dismissals and acquittals makes it difficult to interpret the meaning of 
trends.  Dismissals, more easily than acquittals, can be taken as a sign of increasing ac-
curacy in a system, for reasons discussed in Part II.C. 
75 A case-level effort to estimate acquittal rates that might exist in the absence of 
guilty pleas appears in William M. Rhodes, Plea Bargaining:  Its Effect on Sentencing and 
Convictions in the District of Columbia, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 360 (1979).  Rhodes 
collected several case-file variables that indicate the strength of evidence in order to 
estimate the probability of conviction if a defendant pleading guilty had instead gone 
to trial.  Id. at 364. 
76 In this mental exercise, the imagined trials that the guilty pleas replace take an 
average length of time based on current trial practices, supported with the personnel 
and resources available for the typical trial. 
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plead guilty, at least from a societal perspective where the system’s le-
gitimacy is at stake.77
The theory at the bottom of this enterprise treats trial outcomes, 
by definition, as truthful outcomes.  Obviously, trial outcomes do not 
always accurately reflect the events that occurred at the scene of the 
crime.78  Nevertheless, trial distortion theory relies on the lawyerly as-
sumption, built into the deepest convictions of the adversarial process, 
that this method of ascertaining the truth is more reliable—on aver-
age across a system—than other methods of reconstructing truth after 
the fact.79  In particular, this theory treats the outcome of public pro-
ceedings as presumptively more accurate than the outcome of unseen 
negotiations between the parties.  It also reflects the judgment that a 
prosecutor’s choices about which defendants are factually guilty and 
what range of punishment they deserve should be subject to evalua-
tion by others. 
1.  Trial Distortion and Trial Penalties 
Since the earliest public discussions of “compromises” in criminal 
cases, defenders of plea bargains have argued that the negotiating 
parties simply replicate the likely outcomes of a trial.80  Each party es-
timates the chances of conviction and the sentence a judge would 
probably impose after conviction at trial.  Then together they settle on 
the proper amount to compensate the defendant for removing uncer-
tainty about the outcome at trial and for saving the government and 
77 See Givelber, supra note 7, at 1342-44 (discussing the problem of innocent de-
fendants accepting guilty pleas); Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquit-
ted Defendant, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1297, 1354 (2000) (suggesting that the court should 
not accept a guilty plea from a factually innocent defendant). 
78 For one example of a gap between trial outcomes and truth in the real world, 
see Fox Butterfield, Guns and Jeers Used by Gangs To Buy Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
2005, at 1 (describing the use of intimidation to prevent gang members from cooperat-
ing with the police in drug trials in Boston). 
79 For a comparison of civil- and common-law perspectives on the truth-finding 
function of the trial, see Mirjan Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Mod-
els of Criminal Procedure:  A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 580-87 (1973) (“I 
contend that the continental non-adversary system of procedure is more committed to 
the search for truth than is the Anglo-American adversary system.”). 
80 See Justin Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2-8 (1927) 
(discussing the various sorts of “compromise” that represent viable alternatives to 
criminal trial); Moley, supra note 20, at 123 (summarizing the arguments favoring plea 
bargaining, as stated by prosecutors in the 1920s); S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, Waiver 
of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 25 MICH. L. REV. 695, 710-17 (1927) (arguing that pub-
lic interest theory accepts a guilty plea as an appropriate alternative to a trial in a 
criminal case). 
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its witnesses the resources necessary to try the case.  In this happy ac-
count of rational economic actors, the negotiations for guilty pleas 
take place “in the shadow of the trial” and merely save system re-
sources.81
By invoking this hoary theme in the debates about the legitimacy 
of plea bargaining, I do not make any descriptive claim.  Without a 
doubt, some bargains do not produce results that resemble what a trial 
would have produced; not all bargaining happens in the shadow of 
trials.  Perhaps prosecutors have their reasons to grant concessions 
that are too large; perhaps defense attorneys act as unfaithful agents 
for their clients and ask for too little.82  Defendants themselves might 
poorly predict the likely outcome of a trial.83
Instead, the trial distortion theory is normative:  plea practices are 
good to the extent that they mimic trial results, with proper routine 
sentence discounts.  In this view, not all guilty pleas are created equal 
and not all forms of coercion used to induce a plea of guilty are 
equally troubling.  The coercive power of strong evidence creates no 
concern.  Some defendants plead guilty simply because they accept 
responsibility for their crimes or recognize the futility of resisting the 
government’s strong evidence.  These easy cases would have produced 
convictions even without the guilty pleas, but only after trials pur-
chased at greater public expense, so the savings from the plea can be 
devoted to additional criminal cases or to other social priorities. 
81 For examples of discussions treating plea bargains as taking place in the shadow 
of trials, see Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of “Bargain Justice,” 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
509, 513 (1979) (“Any criminal defendant faces unpleasant alternatives:  he can either 
plead guilty or defend himself at trial.”); Susan N. Herman, Applying Apprendi to the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines:  You Say You Want a Revolution?, 87 IOWA L. REV. 615, 632 
(2002) (“[T]he prosecutors’ and defense attorneys’ estimation of how a jury might de-
cide a case becomes the benchmark against which plea bargaining takes place. . . . It is 
in cases where the two sides have different expectations of a jury . . . that a trial will oc-
cur.”). 
82 See CANDACE MCCOY, POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING:  VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN 
CALIFORNIA xvii (1993) (discussing how politics can cause poor plea bargaining results 
by reducing the amount of scrutiny given to individual cases); Schulhofer, supra note 
55, at 1987-91 (discussing how, in the reality of plea bargaining, “[t]he real parties in 
interest (the public and the defendant) are represented by agents (the prosecutor and 
the defense attorney) whose goals are far from congruent with those of the principals,” 
carrying “a potential for conflicts of interest”). 
83 Stephanos Bibas has ably catalogued a variety of reasons—some of them built 
into the institutional arrangements of the criminal courtroom, others growing out of 
common human failures to process information rationally—that most plea bargains 
may not accurately predict trial results.  See Bibas, supra note 12, at 2496-527 (analyzing 
the various ways in which human psychology poses serious pitfalls for plea bargaining). 
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Trial-distorting plea bargains are more likely to occur in cases 
where the government has weak evidence to support the charges as 
filed.84  In these cases, the discount that a prosecutor offers might 
grow quite large, because a lucrative offer is needed to convince a de-
fendant to give up a strong chance of outright acquittal.  The rational 
prosecutor must set a “market-clearing” price high enough to obtain 
guilty pleas even in weak cases. 
One difficulty with such large plea discounts (or trial penalties) is 
the effect they might have on defendants.85  The difference between 
the predicted sentence after a trial conviction and the predicted sen-
tence after a guilty plea could become so large that some defendants 
would not accurately weigh their options and would not dare go to 
trial, even with a strong defense.86
More to the point, these discounts might grow so large in some 
cases that they become unworthy of public support, regardless of their 
84 See David Lynch, The Impropriety of Plea Agreements:  A Tale of Two Counties, 19 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 115, 132 (1994) (“[M]any prosecutors . . . will . . . resort to offering 
incredibly lenient punishments to assure the entry of guilty pleas in those weak cases 
that probably would and should be lost at trials . . . .”); cf. Albert W. Alschuler, The 
Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 58-65 (1968) (arguing that 
prosecutors seek bargains most persistently in their weakest cases to ensure some posi-
tive outcome); Dean J. Champion, Private Counsels and Public Defenders:  A Look at Weak 
Cases, Prior Records, and Leniency in Plea Bargaining, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. 253, 261-62 (1989) 
(finding that, when deciding the terms of a plea agreement, prosecutors took into ac-
count not only the strength of the evidence but also who represented the defendant). 
85 See Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 
205, 207-09 (applying prospect theory to plea bargaining and arguing that the most 
likely reason for the inapplicability of prospect theory is that prosecutors offer such a 
large guilty plea bonus that it overcomes all other incentives); Hans Zeisl, The Offer 
That Cannot Be Refused, in FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & RICHARD S. FRASE, THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM:  MATERIALS ON THE ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 558, 559-60 (1980) (“[T]he greater the difference between the offered sentence 
and the sentence expected after conviction at trial, the more defendants will plead 
guilty and avoid trial.”); Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal Proc-
ess, 90 HARV. L. REV. 564, 574-76 (1977) (positing that fear of a heavier sentence after 
trial might lead defendants to accept virtually any offered plea bargain). 
86 See Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining:  The Control of Prose-
cutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 45-53 (arguing that most plea bargains are 
unconscionable because they result from unequal bargaining power and involuntary 
because defendants do not understand their situation); Daniel Givelber, Punishing 
Protestations of Innocence:  Denying Responsibility and Its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1363, 1394-98 (2000) (noting that sentencing guidelines punish more strongly those 
who claim to be innocent and that some innocent defendants will plead guilty to avoid 
the possibility of that increased punishment); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A 
Reply:  Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent Defendants, 101 YALE L.J. 2011, 
2012-13 (1992) (arguing that innocent defendants are more risk averse than guilty de-
fendants and are more likely to accept a plea bargain even when a trial probably would 
vindicate them). 
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effect on defendants.  Granted, the public normally should repay a 
defendant for the savings of trial preparation and court resources that 
flow from a guilty plea.  The value of the savings, however, must be 
discounted by the fact that a guilty plea cuts short the public’s chance 
to learn details about the facts in the case because the factual basis for 
the plea, as described at the plea hearing, will offer only a quick 
sketch of the evidence.  Prosecutors see an immediate resource sav-
ings in the office budget when a defendant pleads guilty, but they 
might undervalue the need for public awareness of the details that 
prosecutors already know about the crime and investigation.87  Prose-
cutors with such a blind spot might offer overly large discounts to the 
defendant. 
A guilty plea discount, in addition to rewarding the defendant for 
saving the government trial resources, also reflects the uncertainty 
that a defendant saves the government by pleading guilty.  There are 
some forms of uncertainty, however, that the public should resolve 
only through a trial, even if the defendant offers to remove all risk 
from the case.  When a defendant accepts a steep discount to waive a 
trial that carries only a remote chance of conviction beyond a reason-
able doubt (say, a 20% chance), this is no cause for rejoicing.  Many 
features of the criminal trial, from the rules of evidence to the stan-
dard of proof, declare the importance of a high level of confidence in 
criminal convictions.88  When uncertainty about the accuracy of a con-
viction becomes too high, the public should not be willing to accept 
87 See Gifford, supra note 86, at 70-73 (describing the benefits of the trial process 
for the community, and especially for the victim, affected by a given crime); Abraham 
S. Goldstein, Converging Criminal Justice Systems:  Guilty Pleas and the Public Interest, 49 
SMU L. REV. 567, 570-77 (1996) (proposing techniques to protect the public interest 
in a system given over to party initiative and party control); Kenneth Kipnis, Plea Bar-
gaining:  A Critic’s Rejoinder, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 555, 556-57 (1979) (explaining how 
the public benefits from open jury trials). 
 In some notorious cases that implicate the integrity of criminal justice (for in-
stance, prosecutions of wealthy or famous defendants that raise questions about the 
even-handed quality of enforcement), the public can benefit enormously from a public 
airing of the alleged offense and the government’s investigation.  See, e.g., Barry Meier, 
2 Guilty in Fraud at a Cable Giant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at A1 (discussing the back-
ground and verdict of the Adelphia case); Jury Finds Stewart Guilty on All Counts, L.A. 
TIMES, July 9, 2004, at C2 (reporting on the verdict in Martha Stewart’s trial for con-
spiracy, obstruction of justice, and lying to investigators).  Such a public airing would 
be especially important for cases filed in areas where social attitudes are in flux, such as 
possession of medicinal marijuana or hate crimes. 
88 Even defenses based on the likely exclusion of reliable but illegally obtained evi-
dence should be considered in examining the necessary public confidence in criminal 
proceedings.  One aspect of the public legitimacy of criminal proceedings is the confi-
dence that law enforcement officers respect the relevant legal constraints. 
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the conviction, even when the defendant offers it.89  Because the 
criminal system emphasizes public responses to alleged violations of 
public values, the need to demonstrate the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system must trump the preferences of defendants.  At some 
point, the purchase of too many uncertain convictions undermines 
our confidence that the system is leading to the accurate results nec-
essary for legitimacy. 
The trial distortion theory, therefore, promotes guilty plea nego-
tiations and sentence practices that offer only modest plea discounts 
to defendants.  In setting the legal requirement that a plea of guilty be 
“voluntary,”90 trial distortion theory defines improper coercion to in-
clude any discounts offered in weak cases that are large enough to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.91  If cases of a given eviden-
tiary strength produce a certain pattern of trial outcomes (say, a con-
viction in two out of every three cases), plea negotiations should pro-
duce a similar pattern of outcomes.  Better to have confidence in the 
accuracy of two convictions with sentences near full strength, along 
with one dismissal or acquittal, than to negotiate for three convictions 
that produce weaker sentences and inspire weaker confidence. 
According to these guiding principles, federal plea practices un-
der current sentencing law present a risky proposition.  Granted, the 
ample resources of the federal system do allow agents to build solid 
evidentiary foundations for many cases.  But even in weaker cases 
89 To put the point another way, while “cost bargaining” is acceptable under the 
trial distortion theory, the most extreme cases of “odds bargaining” are not.  See Francis 
James, Effective Plea and Sentence Bargaining in South Africa, JUST ’CAUSE (Vera Inst. of 
Just., New York, N.Y.), Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 3 (“[I]f accused defendants who were guilty 
knew for certain the outcome of a plea of guilty, they would, in fact, plead guilty . . . . 
Poorly implemented, however, plea bargaining could erode the quality of justice by 
encouraging the innocent to plead guilty and undermine public confidence in the 
administration of justice.”); cf. Marc Miller & Norval Morris, Predictions of Dangerousness:  
An Argument for Limited Use, 3 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 263, 278-79 (1988) (drawing a dis-
tinction between the level of proof required at trial and the level of certainty necessary 
to support the use of predictions about a defendant’s dangerousness); Moohr, supra 
note 67, at 214-16 (arguing that public trials provide a rationale for sentences, educate 
the business community about the illegality of specific conduct, and strengthen the 
shared social norms of the business community against fraud). 
90 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2) (“Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo conten-
dere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and determine 
that the plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises (other 
than promises in a plea agreement).”). 
91 Cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (holding that the preju-
dicial effect of substandard attorney performance can lead to reversal when it creates 
prejudice sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, and thus adopting a 
standard lower than preponderance of the evidence). 
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(where the risk of trial distortion is greatest), federal prosecutors have 
little to fear.  The penalties they can impose on defendants start well 
above the typical penalties that most states would impose.92  As we will 
see, current sentencing law gives prosecutors and judges many ways to 
reward cooperation, yet the discounts they offer still result in sen-
tences higher than the norm in the state system.  Sentence severity in 
the federal system today carries a built-in risk that the plea discount 
will become too large and distort hypothetical trial outcomes. 
2.  Are Lost Acquittals and Dismissals Trial Distortions? 
Where do acquittal rates fit into this world centered around the 
hypothetical results that trials would produce?  A trial distortion the-
ory does not imply that there is a particular level of acquittals that is 
healthy or unhealthy; acquittals become a point of concern not simply 
when they become too high or low in absolute terms, but also when 
they change persistently in one direction.93  Moreover, the meaning of 
lower acquittal rates will differ from place to place.  In some places, 
acquittals dwindle because plea bargains are being offered and ac-
cepted in weaker cases.  In other places, however, lower acquittal rates 
show that prosecutorial screening and trial performance are improv-
ing. 
Let us first explore the more discouraging scenario:  when drop-
ping acquittal rates show that more innocent defendants are being 
convicted.  The number of defendants in weak cases who accept plea 
offers should rise over time if prosecutors or judges increase the trial 
penalty.  These increases could result from changes in the law (say, 
the passage of a new mandatory-minimum sentencing law that gives 
92 Although state sentences actually served tend to be lower than the federal sen-
tences served, federal penalties in general do not exceed public expectations for pun-
ishment.  See United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 916-19 (D. Utah 2005) (not-
ing that penalties for some crimes under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines generally 
tracked respective state sentences as well as public opinion); PETER H. ROSSI & RICH-
ARD A. BERK, PUBLIC OPINION ON SENTENCING FEDERAL CRIMES 79-81 (1995), 
http://www.ussc.gov/nss/jp_ch5.pdf (summarizing survey responses regarding just 
punishment for a series of hypothetical cases, and finding that the central tendency of 
public opinion roughly matches guideline ranges for crimes, with exceptions for some 
drug crimes, bank robbery, and some fraud offenses). 
93 Movements in either direction could tell us something about the quality of re-
sults in the justice system.  A sustained increase in acquittals might reveal that some 
prosecutors are losing touch with the values of jurors and the community, or it could 
indicate sloppy investigations.  The guilty pleas resulting from such a system might de-
serve some special scrutiny.  But the more pertinent problem in the current federal 
system (and probably in many state systems, as well) is a persistent decline in acquittals. 
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the prosecutor a new bargaining chip)94 or from a change in policy or 
practice (perhaps an emphasis by a newly elected prosecutor on filing 
habitual-felon charges whenever possible).95  The discount can be-
come quite large; some estimates peg the guilty plea discount at 
roughly half the length of sentences received after conviction at trial.96
Losses in at least some types of dismissals might also indicate trial 
distortion at work.  Dismissals include decisions by judges to terminate 
a case before the end of trial because of inadequate evidence or some 
other problem.  These dismissals are functionally similar to acquittals, 
94 See Drug Mandatory Minimums:  Are They Working?:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 106th 
Cong. 62 (2000) (statement of John Roth, Chief, Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Sec-
tion, Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice) (stating that mandatory-minimum sentences for 
drug crimes provide “an indispensable tool for prosecutors” to induce defendants to 
cooperate). 
95 For an example of the range of charges available to a federal prosecutor to re-
spond to a given set of facts, consider the case of Nathaniel Heatwole.  This student at 
the Quaker-affiliated Guilford College hid box cutters on airplanes to expose weak-
nesses in airport security.  Federal prosecutors originally charged him with a felony 
(taking a dangerous weapon aboard an aircraft) with a ten-year maximum sentence.  
After plea negotiations, prosecutors changed that charge to a misdemeanor with a 
maximum penalty of six months in prison and a $5,000 fine.  Associated Press, Box Cut-
ter Student Cops Plea, Makes Video to Aid Screeners, USA TODAY, Apr. 24, 2004, 
http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2004-04-24-box-cutters_x.htm.  He was ulti-
mately sentenced to two years supervised probation, 100 hours of community service, 
and a $500 fine.  Associated Press, Student in Box-Cutter Case Gets Probation, NEWS-
MAX.COM, June 24, 2004, http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2004/6/24/ 
122102.shtml. 
96 For estimates of the size of the trial penalty, see David Brereton & Jonathan D. 
Casper, Does It Pay To Plead Guilty?  Differential Sentencing and the Functioning of Criminal 
Courts, 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 45, 55-56 (1981); Richard S. Frase, Implementing Commis-
sion-Based Sentencing Guidelines:  The Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 279, 316-19 (1993) (finding that defendants found guilty at trial were 
significantly more likely to receive a prison sentence than those who pled guilty); 
Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment:  Differences in Sentences After Guilty 
Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 973-75 
(2005) (estimating the guilty plea discount for different crime types); Thomas M. 
Uhlman & N. Darlene Walker, “He Takes Some of My Time; I Take Some of His”:  An Analy-
sis of Judicial Sentencing Patterns in Jury Cases, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 323, 327-37 (1980) 
(presenting the occurrence of a guilty plea discount in Metro City data); Hans Zeisel, 
The Disposition of Felony Arrests, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 407, 444-49 (estimating, in 
one selection of cases, a 42% increase in severity from sentences offered in exchange 
for guilty pleas to those eventually imposed following trial); Comment, The Influence of 
the Defendant’s Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 207 (1956) 
(“[Judges’] estimates of the extent to which the fine or prison term was diminished for 
a defendant pleading guilty varied from 10 to 95 per cent of the punishment which 
would ordinarily be given after trial and conviction.” (footnote omitted)). 
114 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 79 
 
so a decrease in this type of dismissal would mean roughly the same 
thing to defendants as a decrease in acquittals.97
Dismissals also include decisions by prosecutors to terminate cases 
early.  Prosecutors commonly dismiss a case after reviewing the file or 
interviewing the witnesses and realizing that the preliminary reading 
of the evidence was overly optimistic.  If guilty pleas replace dismissals 
that correct such inadvertent overcharges, they distort the outcomes 
that would have emerged from the trial process. 
Dismissals could also happen when a prosecutor finds it necessary 
to correct a deliberate overcharge.  Under this scenario, after a prosecu-
tor asks for a plea of guilty to an untenable charge (“It never hurts to 
ask”), the defendant is not fooled and declines the offer, and the 
prosecutor gives up on the ruse and dismisses the case.98  A decline in 
this type of prosecutor dismissal could indicate that more defendants 
are taken in by the maneuver (and are pleading guilty to unfounded 
charges), a troubling prospect under the trial distortion theory.99  But 
a decline in dismissals might also indicate that prosecutors are making 
fewer of these gambits in the first place, which would be good news 
for trial distortion purposes.  Thus, given these various sub-types that 
point in different directions, dismissals send out even more ambigu-
ous trial-distorting signals than acquittals do. 
3.  The Accuracy Hypothesis 
As we have seen, there is an alternative explanation for declines in 
both acquittals and dismissals, one with more benign implications 
than a trial distortion theory.  Instead of postulating that fewer acquit-
tals result from more defendants abandoning viable defenses because 
of a higher trial penalty, such lower acquittal rates might simply mean 
that the quality of cases filed is improving over time.  This “accuracy 
hypothesis” could prove true if prosecutors screen cases more care-
97 Acquittals have different appeal and double jeopardy consequences than some 
dismissals by judges.  See United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1892) (finding 
that following the acquittal of a defendant, the State can neither appeal nor seek a new 
trial). 
98 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (“The prosecutor in a criminal 
case shall . . . refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not sup-
ported by probable cause . . . .”). 
99 See Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 740-41, 750-
58 (2001) (criticizing bargains for pleas of guilty to nonexistent, inapplicable, or time-
barred crimes, and arguing that judges should reject those bargains).  If the prosecu-
tor overcharges the case but the defendant ultimately pleads guilty to a lesser charge to 
which she has no viable defense, then the prosecutor’s charging decision amounted to 
harmless error and the case presents no problems for trial distortion purposes. 
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fully as they enter the system or if investigators assemble stronger cases 
in the first place.100  It could also happen if prosecutors solidify cases 
after they are filed through more complete preparation for trial.101  If 
cases were strengthened in this way, a drop in the acquittal rate would 
accurately reflect the government’s better prospects at trial, and 
would not indicate any distortion of trial outcomes during plea nego-
tiations.102
A prosecutor’s office that receives more resources (whether it be 
new funding from the legislature or more available hours because 
fewer existing cases go to trial) could spend those resources either on 
extra quantity or on extra quality.  When the new resources buy extra 
quantity, newly added cases are likely to involve less serious crimes or 
less persuasive evidence, because the office would have already se-
lected the highest priority cases with the first available funds.103
When new resources buy extra quality, however, the system out-
comes change to reflect the better truth-finding function of the sys-
tem.  Improvements in case screening would shift careful prosecuto-
rial scrutiny of the case to the pre-charge stage and would 
consequently drive down the dismissal rates.104  An investment in 
higher-quality case screening might also lead to lower acquittal rates.  
100 See Wright & Miller, supra note 23, at 116-17 (concluding that principled 
screening in New Orleans created positive outcomes while reducing reliance on plea 
bargains); Note, The Elimination of Plea Bargaining in Black Hawk County:  A Case Study, 
60 IOWA L. REV. 1053, 1066-69 (1975) (finding that improved screening in an Iowa 
county accounted for the fact that, despite the elimination of guilty pleas, the convic-
tion rate remained unchanged). 
101 See Bruce H. Kobayashi & John R. Lott, Jr., In Defense of Criminal Defense Expendi-
tures and Plea Bargaining, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 397, 407-11 (1996) (finding that ap-
propriate prosecutorial preparation leads to guilty defendants receiving more overall 
punishment than innocent defendants). 
102 See Finkelstein, supra note 14, at 306-07 (noting that acquittal and dismissal 
rates in different districts are based on a similar mix of crimes charged).  But cf. Al-
schuler, supra note 19, at 28 n.151 (discussing Finkelstein’s failure to examine in depth 
the possible differences in charging and evidentiary quality from district to district). 
103 See Michael M. O’Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender:  Punishment, Culpabil-
ity, and Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 181-83 (2004) (arguing 
that the increased number of environmental prosecutions likely reflects the fact that 
more marginal cases are being brought).  The new cases added with the additional re-
sources will not necessarily be the least serious in the mix, if the resources arrive as 
perceptions are shifting about which crimes are serious.  For instance, if metham-
phetamine cases receive higher priority just as prosecutors find extra resources to de-
vote to them, the new cases will not be perceived as the least serious charged. 
104 If a prosecutor’s office adopts poor screening structures, a case that is too weak 
might get filed before the prosecutor reviews it carefully.  When an overworked prose-
cutor finally turns to the case for trial preparation and discovers its weaknesses, dis-
missal is a better option than going to trial with only slim chances of success. 
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Roughly speaking, stronger cases selected at the start should produce 
stronger results at trial for the government.105  Similarly, if improved 
preparation reveals flaws in the evidence that can be remedied (for 
instance, a witness who needs additional documentary support to tell 
the truth convincingly) the acquittal rate should go down.106
Thus, the tradeoff between quantity and quality of cases could of-
fer an important clue as to whether dropping acquittals in a particular 
system present good news (the accuracy hypothesis) or bad news (trial 
distortion).  Based on this criterion, it appears that the most recent 
era in federal criminal justice is the most worrisome, for reasons we 
will now explore. 
III.  WHAT MADE FEDERAL ACQUITTALS DISAPPEAR? 
So far, I have argued that the combination of higher guilty plea 
rates and lower rates of acquittal in a jurisdiction creates a real source 
of concern.  Why did these outcomes shift over time in the federal sys-
tem?  In this section, I concentrate on the most likely causes for two 
eras of noteworthy change:  the guilty plea decreases of the 1950s and 
1960s and the guilty plea increases from the 1980s to the present.  
Part IV will narrow the focus to consider in more detail the troubling 
developments in the most recent decade. 
The causation story changes as we move from one era to the next.  
Some earlier changes in guilty plea and acquittal rates may have re-
flected an increasingly accurate system, probably based on improve-
ments in access to defense counsel and lower workloads for judges.  
Developments in the last twenty-five years, however, were more likely 
the result of prosecutorial negotiation techniques that distorted trial 
105 It is possible that high-quality case screening can coexist with high acquittal 
rates.  Some prosecutors’ offices that set consistently demanding standards for the fil-
ing of cases nevertheless take some calculated risks and lose a relatively large number 
of cases at trial.  See, e.g., Wright & Miller, supra note 23, at 76-77 (describing the rela-
tively high rate of acquittals in New Orleans). 
106 If extra trial preparation reveals fatal flaws in more cases, it would probably in-
crease the dismissal rate because the prosecutor would not often forge ahead to try a 
hopeless case. 
 Economic theory might suggest that prosecutors probably devote more marginal 
new resources to case screening and negotiating efforts than to improved trial prepara-
tion.  Attorneys always give high priority to trial preparation because trials are such 
visible events with an impact on the prosecutor’s professional reputation; put in eco-
nomic terms, trial preparation resembles a fixed cost, while the quality of case screen-
ing and the quantity of cases reviewed for possible charges both look more like variable 
costs.  Cf. Lynch, supra note 84, at 130-31 (arguing that lawyers may rise to the occasion 
when in the constructively adversarial environment of a trial, but that more variation 
exists in the quality of counsel during plea negotiations). 
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outcomes.  In particular, federal sentencing law over those decades 
changed to give prosecutors and judges greater ability to impose an 
ever larger and more certain penalty on defendants who go to trial.  It 
has become far too costly in federal court to claim and prove inno-
cence. 
A.  Case Volume 
The volume of defendants and cases passing through American 
criminal justice systems increased throughout the twentieth century.107  
As time in the criminal courtroom grew scarcer, a major time-saver 
grew to dominate the system.  Not surprisingly, then, many historians 
of plea bargaining point to rising workloads of criminal justice actors 
as the best explanation for their embrace of plea bargains.108
In the federal system, this account holds some weight, but the role 
of case volume and workload is complex.  Once we adjust for the in-
creasing number of judges and prosecutors assigned to the system 
over the years, we see that case volume has had mixed effects on guilty 
plea and acquittal rates.  As the discussion in this section demon-
strates, a lighter workload for judges over the years produced fewer 
guilty pleas and more acquittals, but lighter workloads for prosecutors 
over time led to just the opposite result:  more guilty pleas and fewer 
acquittals. 
We can explore caseload at the simplest level by tracing the vol-
ume of cases moving through the system each year.  In gross terms, 
higher federal case volume did seem to produce higher guilty plea 
rates.  The increases in guilty plea rates that began in the 1980s hap-
107 See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE HABITS OF LEGALITY:  CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 29-30 (1996) (providing statistics indicating both increased crime and 
increased incarceration). 
108 See, e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the 
Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547, 574-77 (identifying a German statute 
“designed specifically to . . . alleviate the workload of judges and prosecutors,” which 
“significantly contributed to the expansion of plea bargaining”); Fisher, supra note 11, 
at 865 (noting that prosecutors in the nineteenth century “plea bargained to ease their 
crushing workloads”); Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286, 286 (1972) 
(arguing that plea bargaining is necessary because the American system renders it 
“impossible for every defendant to claim his right to a jury trial”).  For the view repudi-
ating the importance of caseload, see Jo Dixon, The Organizational Context of Criminal 
Sentencing, 100 AM. J. SOC. 1157, 1177 (1995) for examples of studies demonstrating 
that plea rates are unrelated to caseload; also useful is Stephen P. Lagoy et al., An Em-
pirical Study on Information Usage for Prosecutorial Decision Making in Plea Negotiations, 13 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 435, 462 (1976), which provides, “It appears that where case load 
pressures were less, there was actually a greater probability of the acceptance of a plea 
bargain.” 
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pened alongside annual increases in the number of defendants mov-
ing through the system.109  At first glance, the connection is also fairly 
strong between case volume and acquittal rates.  The last three dec-
ades have been typical:  as case volume increased, acquittals de-
creased.110
Despite the apparent connection between volume on the one 
hand and acquittal and guilty plea rates on the other, raw case volume 
is a misleading proxy for the caseloads that prosecutors and judges ac-
tually face when processing cases.  As the total volume in the system 
increases, legislatures periodically add capacity to the system by fund-
ing new prosecutors and judges.111  Thus, a doubling of the case vol-
ume might produce no real change in the caseload for individuals if 
the number of prosecutors and judges also eventually doubles. 
The connection between case volume and guilty plea rates and 
acquittal rates weakens substantially after adjusting the annual crimi-
nal caseload in light of the number of federal judges and prosecutors 
at work in those years.  The spectacular influx of cases during Prohibi-
tion, however, did produce a link between increased workload and 
decreased acquittals.  During those thirteen years, the number of 
prosecutors and judges never had time to catch up with the increase 
in cases.112  During later periods, however, when the growth in volume 
109 The number of defendants in terminated cases rose from 44,585 in 1971 to 
78,835 in 2002.  The correlation over time between guilty plea rates and sheer volume, 
however, is not perfect.  For instance, the volume of defendants stayed fairly steady 
from 1951 to 1971, when guilty plea rates dropped and acquittal rates climbed back 
up.  By 1956, the caseload was between 30,000 and 40,000 defendants, where it re-
mained even during the long slide in guilty pleas until 1971.  Guilty plea rates and vol-
ume figures part ways at other points as well.  In the period before Prohibition, guilty 
plea rates actually began their steep climb in 1912, before volume had picked up very 
much.  See Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 1. 
 One statistical measure of the match between two sets of numbers, a Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient, was moderately strong for the overall period, 1910-2002, at 
0.54. 
110 The correlation between acquittal rates and volume of cases terminated during 
the period from 1910 to 2002 equals -0.73; the correlation for the period from 1945 to 
2002 is similarly strong, at -0.74. 
111 Cf. Richard T. Boylan, Fiscal Federalism and the War on Drugs 1 (Nov. 29, 2003), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=474161 (discussing how “a higher fraction 
of drug incarcerations are federal in states . . . with lower per-capita income,” indicat-
ing that these states are less capable of prosecuting drug cases at the state level). 
112 See ALI, supra note 26, at 57 (explaining that during Prohibition, the criminal 
justice system was “not geared to handle this increase in business”); Alschuler, supra 
note 19, at 32 (suggesting that the end of Prohibition might explain the drop in guilty 
pleas between 1920 and 1936); John F. Padgett, Plea Bargaining and Prohibition in the 
Federal Courts, 1908-1934, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 413, 419-24 (1990) (discussing “guilty 
pleas as a response to caseload” before and during Prohibition). 
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was more incremental and allowed the addition of new judgeships and 
prosecutor positions, volume had much weaker effects.  Surprisingly, 
the average number of cases terminated per judge and per prosecutor 
declined over the years because the number of new judges and prose-
cutors outpaced the rise in case volume. 
In the specific context of judicial criminal caseload, the average 
number of criminal cases terminated per district court judge declined 
consistently from 1950 to 1981 and then rose modestly during the last 
two decades, as Table 2 shows.113  When judges had more time to de-
vote to criminal cases, the guilty plea rate tended to fall and the ac-
quittal rate tended to rise:  the judicial workload fell along with the 
guilty plea rate from the 1950s through the 1970s.  The gentle rise in 
the judicial criminal caseload since 1981 corresponded with the large 
increase in the guilty plea rate and large decrease in the acquittal 
rate.114
 
113 The criminal cases flowing through the federal courts are not the only source 
of caseload pressure.  Particularly for the judges, an expanding civil docket creates 
pressure to dispose of all cases more quickly.  Fisher, supra note 11, at 867 (“As judges 
devoted a hugely increasing proportion of their time to the civil caseload, they devoted 
a shrinking proportion to the criminal caseload, and they resolved more and more 
criminal cases by guilty plea.”).  The number of civil cases filed has increased more 
quickly than the number of cases on the criminal docket over the last sixty years, possi-
bly causing judges to be more amenable to guilty pleas in order to clear their criminal 
dockets more efficiently.  See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial:  An Examination of Tri-
als and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 492 
(2004) (noting the disparity in the two dockets’ increase, and suggesting a causal con-
nection between the more dramatic increase in civil caseloads and guilty pleas). 
 Between 1945 and 2002, the combined caseload per judge fluctuated several 
times.  Between 1945 and 1968, the combined judicial caseload dropped from 542 to a 
low of 311.  The caseload then increased for a time, up to a high of 640 in 1985, before 
dropping back to around 550 in the last few years.  More detailed combined caseload 
numbers appear in the Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 3. 
 The match between these combined judicial caseloads and guilty plea rates is tol-
erably good, but imperfect.  The long decline in guilty pleas from 1951 to 1971 mostly 
coincided with a decreased judicial caseload, and the first half of the sustained rise in 
guilty pleas during the last three decades matched a rise in the judicial caseload.  
When judges had more time for each case, apparently they did not encourage guilty 
pleas so strongly.  Since 1985, however, the connection between these factors has dis-
appeared.  See Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 3. 
114 More specific judicial criminal workload numbers appear in the Statistical Ap-
pendix, supra note 13, at app. 3.    
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Table 2:  Criminal Cases Terminated per Judge and  
per Prosecutor in Federal Courts, 1950-2000 
 
 Cases per 
Prosecutor 
Cases per  
Judge 
1950 --- 183 
1955 --- 171 
1960 51 137 
1965 50 117 
1970 37 111 
1975 33 128 
1980 19 76 
1985 21 95 
1990 19 106 
1995 13 91 
2000 15 123 
 
The match, however, between judicial criminal caseload on the 
one side and guilty plea or acquittal rates on the other side is imper-
fect.  Some years were mismatches; in addition, the guilty plea and ac-
quittal rate changes over the last two decades were much stronger 
than the gradual increases in judicial criminal caseloads.  Overall, 
there was only a weak correlation between judicial criminal caseload 
on the one hand and guilty plea or acquittal rates on the other.115
Although the fact is counterintuitive, the criminal caseload of 
prosecutors also appears to have become lighter over the last four 
decades.  Unlike the judicial caseload, which fluctuated over time, the 
prosecutor caseload fell pretty steadily during the last half of the twen-
tieth century.  The average number of criminal cases terminated per 
prosecutor was about fifty-five in 1958, but, as Table 2 shows, by 1980 
it was down to nineteen, in the same neighborhood as the current fig-
ure.116  Thus, the expansion in the number of federal criminal prose-
 
115 Between 1945 and 2002, the correlation coefficient between judicial criminal 
caseload and the guilty plea rate was 0.20; the correlation between judicial criminal 
caseload and the acquittal rate was - 0.15. 
116 The number of Assistant U.S. Attorneys rose from 582 in 1958 to 5304 in 2002.  
See Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 3.  More specific prosecutor workload 
numbers appear in the Statistical Appendix.  Id.  The workload calculation used here 
(total number of cases terminated in a year divided by the average number of Assistant 
U.S. Attorneys employed during that year) is imperfect because it includes both civil 
and criminal litigators, but a more precise breakdown is not available for a long span 
of years.  For an example of a similar calculation, see Michael Edmund O’Neill, When 
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cutors more than compensated for the increased criminal case volume 
in the federal courts over the years.117
New prosecutor positions outpaced new case volume from the 
1950s to 1990, meaning that prosecutors had more time to devote to 
each case on average.  Perhaps the new resources went into higher 
quality rather than greater quantity of cases.118  Two time periods, 
however, cast a more negative light on the effect of prosecutor 
caseloads.  First, prosecutor caseloads fell even during periods when 
acquittal rates rose, such as the 1960s.  Second, prosecutor caseloads 
stayed constant from 1990 to the present, a period of sharply falling 
acquittal rates.119
These patterns do not speak well for the accuracy hypothesis.  
Since acquittal rates increased during some periods when the overall 
prosecutor caseload decreased, it is difficult to maintain that federal 
prosecutors used their extra time to produce more accurate results 
through screening cases more accurately or preparing more thor-
oughly for trial.  Moreover, since caseloads stayed flat during the most 
recent drop in acquittal rates, it is hard to believe that extra prosecu-
tor efforts in each case produced more accurate outcomes during this 
period. 
Prosecutors Don’t:  Trends in Federal Prosecutorial Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 
258-59 (2004) (combining both civil and criminal litigators). 
117 The effect of the increasing civil docket on plea bargaining could also reach 
prosecutors, although the impact should be slight, as the U.S. Attorneys’ offices devote 
separate staff to civil litigation.  When we count only civil cases involving the govern-
ment as a litigant, civil and criminal cases per prosecutor decreased from the 1950s to 
1974, increased for the next decade, and then decreased again from 1985 to 2002.  
Again, as with the criminal caseload, the decline in combined caseload per prosecutor 
happened early, and flattened out in recent years.  See Statistical Appendix, supra note 
13, at app. 3. 
118 A law enforcement agency such as the FBI might also aim for quality over quan-
tity, meaning that as the cases get more factually complex and varied, the amount of 
time needed to reach a minimum level of competence for each case increases.  See, e.g., 
M. Elaine Nugent & Mark L. Miller, Basic Factors in Determining Prosecutor Workload, 
PROSECUTOR, July-Aug. 2002, at 32, 36 (concluding that criminal cases with “complica-
tions” have longer “case processing times”); cf. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. 
PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE 194-95 (1981) (concluding that the increased rate in 
plea bargains resulted from the professionalization of police and prosecutors and from 
increased reliance on law enforcement); Padgett, supra note 112, at 441-44 (stating 
that the professionalization of the FBI during the 1920s led to stronger evidence and 
contributed to declining acquittal rates in that decade). 
119 Prosecutor workloads correlated more strongly than judicial criminal work-
loads with guilty plea and acquittal rates.  The correlation between prosecutor caseload 
and guilty plea rates for the period from 1958 to 2002 was moderately strong, at -0.45.  
The correlation between prosecutor workload and acquittals was even stronger, at 
0.62. 
122 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 79 
 
B.  Legal Complexity and Defense Counsel in the 1950s and 1960s 
The legal tools available to criminal judges, prosecutors, and de-
fense lawyers change over time.  When legal rules change to create 
more cumbersome trials, in theory guilty plea rates should rise be-
cause the legal actors (especially the prosecutors and judges) have 
greater incentive to avoid trials.120
These general observations about criminal adjudication, however, 
did not play out as predicted in the federal system.  The federal 
criminal court rules became more complex during the 1950s and 
1960s, but the rule changes that made trials more expensive actually 
contributed to rising trial rates and acquittals during that era.  The 
most important legal changes of that era, especially the widespread 
availability of defense counsel, gave more complete information to de-
fendants about the strength of the government’s case and made a 
threat to go to trial more credible. 
During some earlier eras in federal criminal justice, simpler legal 
rules made it possible to conduct cheaper trials, and more trials did 
result, just as one might predict.121  But the profound legal changes 
that reshaped federal criminal justice in the 1950s and 1960s also 
made it clear that some forms of procedural complexity—laws that 
make trials more expensive—can nevertheless cause trial rates to go 
up.  The longest sustained rise in federal criminal trial rates happened 
120 See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.1(b) (4th ed. 
2004) (listing “the broadening of the right to counsel” and “the due process revolu-
tion” among the reasons for the expansion of guilty pleas); Malcolm M. Feeley, Legal 
Complexity and the Transformation of the Criminal Process:  The Origins of Plea Bargaining, 31 
ISRAEL L. REV. 183, 218 (1997) (finding that “as trials became more vigorous and com-
plex, lawyers came to rely on an alternative, the guilty plea”); John H. Langbein, Under-
standing the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 261, 264 (1979) (de-
scribing the relative simplicity of trials in the time before plea bargaining became 
common); see also David L. Cook et al., Criminal Caseload in U.S. District Courts:  More 
Than Meets the Eye, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1579, 1593-94 (1995) (suggesting that the number 
of criminal cases understates true workload because criminal cases have become more 
lengthy). 
121 See Alschuler, supra note 19, at 42 (“The simpler and more straightforward the 
trial process, the more likely it is that the process will be used.”).  Bench trials, which 
are usually simpler and less expensive than jury trials, became available in the federal 
courts in the 1930s, a time when guilty plea rates did fall.  See Patton v. United States, 
281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930) (holding that the defendant may waive her constitutional 
right to a jury trial); FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a) (stating that if a defendant is entitled to a 
jury trial, the defendant must have such a trial unless the defendant waives it in writing, 
the government consents, and the court approves).  However, the simplifying effect of 
federal bench trials did not last long, and by the 1940s guilty pleas increased again 
even while the number of bench trials continued at their previous levels.  See Statistical 
Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 5. 
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between 1951 and 1971.  During these same years, the Warren Court 
reinterpreted the Constitution to provide federal defendants with sev-
eral new claims to raise before trial, relating to searches, seizures, in-
terrogations, and identifications.122  These changes to the governing 
trial procedures had some effect on the cost of trials, as seen through 
an increase in the average length of a federal trial as the decades 
passed.123
Although many legal changes contributed to the length and com-
plexity of trials, the right to defense counsel in particular probably 
helped decrease the guilty plea rates for a time.  The drop in guilty 
plea rates between 1951 and 1971 coincided with the emergence of 
the right to defense counsel in routine federal criminal cases.  This 
right to appointed counsel in federal court, first recognized as a con-
stitutional requirement in 1938,124 did not become an everyday reality 
until more than two decades passed.  Federal defendants who could 
not afford an attorney (an estimated one-third to one-half of all fed-
eral defendants at that time) received appointed lawyers,125 but those 
lawyers received neither compensation nor funds to pay for expert 
122 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961) (enforcing the exclusion of evi-
dence obtained by unlawful seizure); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966) 
(ruling that an individual held for interrogation must be informed of her right to con-
sult with an attorney and to have the attorney present during police interrogation); 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967) (requiring court scrutiny of all pre-
trial confrontations of the accused to determine if presence of counsel is necessary for 
a fair trial); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418 (1969) (reinforcing a high 
standard of accuracy in identifications); cf. Ronald F. Wright, How the Supreme Court De-
livers Fire and Ice to State Criminal Justice, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1432-38 (2002) 
(explaining how the Warren Court forced a shift in police practices and courtroom 
customs). 
123 In the 1950s, criminal trials averaged less than two days each.  The average in-
creased through the years to a high of 3.48 days in 1997, before falling slightly over the 
last five years.  Estimates of trial length, based on data from the AOUSC, appear in the 
Statistical Appendix, supra note 13.  But the longer criminal trials in federal court oc-
curred during both the increases and the decreases in the guilty plea rates.  They also 
occurred regardless of whether acquittal rates were high or low. 
124 Although a 1790 statute provided for appointed counsel in some capital cases, 
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. IX, § 29, 1 Stat. 112, 118, the constitutional requirement was 
not announced until Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 469 (1938).  See also Evans v. Rives, 
126 F.2d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (holding that the right to counsel in all criminal 
prosecutions is not limited to felonies); David Fellman, The Constitutional Right to Coun-
sel in Federal Courts, 30 NEB. L. REV. 559, 561-62 (1951) (discussing the legal evolution 
of the right to counsel in criminal cases). 
125 FED. R. CRIM. P. 44 (1966) (instituting the appointment of lawyers for the indi-
gent in all stages of a criminal proceeding); see also REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL’S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE 16-17 (1963) [hereinafter COMM. REPORT ON POVERTY] (providing results of a 
study on provision of appointed lawyers). 
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witnesses, investigators, or other defense services.  The lawyers were 
also appointed to the case at arraignment, after several important 
events in the case had already transpired.126
The formal right to federal defense counsel became more mean-
ingful in 1964 with the passage of legislation authorizing and funding 
a national system of federal public defenders and panel attorneys.127  
As more federal defendants gained practical access to compensated 
defense lawyers for the first time, they became more likely to go to 
trial.128  The appointed lawyers helped argue for lower bail and ad-
vised some defendants during preliminary hearings.129  Defense attor-
neys also provided more defendants with an independent estimate of 
their odds of victory at trial; in addition, the availability of investiga-
tors and experts actually increased their odds of acquittal.130
Another legal tool strengthened the position of defendants during 
this time and may have empowered them to go to trial more often.  
Congress passed the Bail Reform Act in 1966, which made it easier for 
federal defendants to gain their release from detention before trial.131  
Because defendants who remain in detention before trial are more 
anxious to resolve their cases, they plead guilty more often than de-
fendants who are released pending trial; additionally, because de-
tained defendants cannot assist their attorneys in locating witnesses 
and evidence, their chances of acquittal are lower.132  Thus, changes in 
pretrial release practices could have contributed to the decrease in 
126 See COMM. REPORT ON POVERTY, supra note 125, at 24 (highlighting the strate-
gic importance of counsel’s presence in early stages of the trial). 
127 Act of Aug. 20, 1964,  Pub. L. No. 88-455, § 3006A, 78 Stat. 552. 
128 See COMM. REPORT ON POVERTY, supra note 125, at 19.  The rising trial rates 
(and corresponding drop in guilty plea rates) during this period are depicted in Fig-
ure 1.  See also Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 1.  The federal experience 
appears to conflict with Malcolm Feeley’s thesis that plea negotiations increase when 
more defendants have access to defense attorneys.  See Malcolm M. Feeley, Plea Bargain-
ing and the Structure of the Criminal Process, 7 JUST. SYS. J. 338, 340 (1982) (arguing that as 
resources, including defense counsel, have become more accessible to the accused, the 
opportunity for negotiation has also increased). 
129 See COMM. REPORT ON POVERTY, supra note 125, at 24 (discussing the trial-
oriented role defense counsel can play in earlier stages in the proceedings). 
130 Id. at 26-29. 
131 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (2000). 
132 See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 237 (1968) (“The fact that a defendant has been detained pending trial should 
not be allowed to prejudice him at the time of trial or sentencing.”); VERA INSTITUTE, 
TEN YEAR REPORT, 1961-1971, at 18 (1972) (“[T]he detainee is more apt to be con-
victed than if he were free on bail . . . .”); Note, Compelling Appearance in Court:  Admini-
stration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1048 (1954) (discussing the 
negative effects on preparation for trial when a defendant cannot post bail). 
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guilty pleas and the increase in acquittals during the late 1960s (al-
though both of these trends began well before the passage of the bail 
statute).133  Similarly, the arrival of pretrial detention under legislation 
passed in 1984 and upheld three years later against constitutional at-
tack134 may have contributed slightly to the increased guilty plea rates 
and decreased acquittal rates of the 1980s and 1990s (although the 
rates started moving a few years before the bail reform statute took ef-
fect). 
It thus appears that many of the same legal changes that made 
federal trials longer and more complex also made acquittals more re-
alistic for defendants.  In particular, the increased prevalence of de-
fense counsel made defendants better informed and less desperate 
during plea negotiations.  These changes in the adversarial testing of 
each case, in turn, likely improved the accuracy of outcomes in the 
federal system during the 1960s and 1970s. 
C.  Crime of the Decade 
The federal criminal code, even more than state criminal codes, 
has expanded to cover more and more conduct over the years.135  But 
the real footprint of federal criminal justice is measured not by the 
reach of the code, but by the number and type of cases actually filed. 
133 See DANIEL J. FREED & PATRICIA M. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES 63 (Nat’l 
Conf. on Bail and Criminal Justice:  May 26-29, 1964) (showing that 60% of recom-
mended parolees in New York were acquitted as opposed to the mere 23% of those 
who were not recommended). 
134 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-54 (1984); see Salerno v. United States, 481 U.S. 739, 755 
(1987) (holding that the “provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail Reform Act of 
1984 fall within [the] carefully limited” category of acceptable instances of detention). 
135 See AM. BAR ASS’N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7-11 (1997) (reveal-
ing that more than 40% of federal criminal statutes were enacted over the past thirty 
years); John S. Baker, Jr., Measuring the Explosive Growth of Federal Crime Legislation 5 
(2004) http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/practicegroupnewsletters/criminallaw/ 
crimreportfinal.pdf (discussing an ABA report that documents an “explosive growth” 
in federal criminal law since 1970); 1 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., Report of the Federal 
Courts Study Committee, in WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS, July 1, 1990, 
at 1, 23-39 (attributing the judicial caseload spiral to the recent broad range of statutes 
creating or implying new federal causes of action); Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice:  
The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 645 (1997) (discussing the en-
croachment of the federal criminal code on state criminal laws); L.B. Schwartz, Federal 
Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors’ Discretion, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 64, 65 (1948) 
(discussing the extension of federal law into the traditional state realm); see also Wil-
liam J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 517 
(2001) (arguing that federal criminal law “probably covers more conduct . . . than any 
state criminal code”). 
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There are certain constants in the mix of crimes that attract the 
attention of federal prosecutors.  Various forms of fraud and theft 
have remained staples of the federal docket, occupying between 20% 
and 35% of the cases filed over the last six decades.136  But as criminal 
behavior changes or (more likely) as the priorities of U.S. Attorneys 
change, the federal criminal docket evolves to reflect these changes as 
the generations pass.137
The shifting mix of crimes prosecuted helps explain the peaks 
and valleys in the rates of guilty pleas and acquittals.  Some crimes are 
simply easier to prove than others, and some investigating agencies 
may be especially efficient at assembling the necessary facts to support 
a criminal conviction.138  Whatever the precise reason, a change in the 
number of certain crimes can shift the overall trends in guilty pleas or 
acquittals. 
The liquor cases filed between 1920 and 1933 offer one possible 
explanation for a period of high guilty plea rates and low acquittal 
rates.139  In one sense, the liquor cases were not radically different 
from other federal cases, as they produced acquittal rates and guilty 
plea rates virtually identical to those seen in the rest of the federal 
criminal docket.140  However, the differential between the sentence 
imposed after trial and the sentence imposed after a guilty plea (a 
rough approximation of the trial penalty) was distinct from that of the 
other cases in the federal docket.  The proportion of liquor defen-
dants receiving a prison sentence rose by 28 percentage points when 
136 For the precise figures, see the Statistical Appendix, supra note 13.  See also 
Cook et al., supra note 120, at 1586 (showing that forgery and counterfeiting cases de-
clined dramatically from 1972 to 1994). 
137 For a discussion of the quantity of immigration, automobile theft, bank rob-
bery, and weapons crimes on the federal criminal docket during different eras, see the 
Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 4.  Since 1995, immigration cases have be-
come more prominent and the high guilty plea rate and low acquittal rate for those 
cases have shifted the overall case mix.  From 1960 to 1980, relatively simple Dyer Act 
prosecutions had some influence on the criminal docket. 
138 Cf. Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 247, 257  (1979) (arguing that plea bargaining resulted less from caseload 
pressures than from increased quality of proof as a consequence of professionalization 
of prosecutors and police). 
139 See H.R. REP. NO. 71-722, at 56 (1931) (discussing plea bargains in the federal 
system made necessary by caseload pressures); Rubin, supra note 26, at 496-97 (analyz-
ing the number of criminal prosecutions for violations of the Prohibition Act).  The 
National Prohibition Act used to be at 27 U.S.C. § 1 (1919) (repealed 1935). 
140 Based on a sample of cases from thirteen districts, 2.3% of terminated liquor 
cases ended in acquittals, versus 2.9% of terminated non-liquor cases.  Comparable 
numbers also appear for guilty pleas, with 72.6% of liquor cases ending in guilty pleas, 
versus 72.5% of all other cases.  ALI, supra note 26, at 115. 
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the defendants went to trial; for the non-liquor defendants, the sen-
tence increased by only 7 points.141
These are evocative numbers when viewed through the lens of 
trial distortion theory.  Apparently, in the liquor cases, federal prose-
cutors had to offer larger concessions in their recommended sen-
tences before defendants would give up their valuable trial rights.  It is 
possible that the jury appeal of the liquor cases made them systemati-
cally weaker than other federal cases.  If that was the case, the offers of 
greater discounts in liquor cases helped to suppress what otherwise 
might have been a substantial increase in the acquittal rate. 
Like the liquor cases, federal narcotics cases also varied in impor-
tant ways over the years.142  The proportion of the federal criminal 
docket devoted to narcotics cases grew spectacularly in the last half of 
the twentieth century, with more than a six-fold increase over five dec-
ades.143
When narcotics crimes constituted a smaller part of the docket, 
defendants were especially likely to go to trial.  In 1951, about 75% of 
the drug defendants ended their cases in guilty pleas, compared to 
83% of the total defendant population.  During the 1950s and 1960s, 
the guilty plea rate for drug cases stayed below the rates for other 
types of crimes, even as the overall rates declined.144  But when the 
guilty plea rates for non-drug crimes rose again in the early 1970s, the 
plea rates for drug cases increased more quickly and drew closer to 
the norm.145  Thus, as the drug cases asserted a larger and larger role 
141 Id. at 141. The percentage of sentences involving imprisonment for non-liquor 
convictions was 82.1% after trial and 75.6% after a guilty plea.  For liquor convictions 
the percentage was 62.4% after trial and 34.5% after a guilty plea.  Id. 
142 See Cook et al., supra note 120, at 1583-90 (showing that drug cases fell from 
1973 to 1980, but rose from 1980 to 1994). 
143 These crimes accounted for 6% of the defendants on the federal docket in 
1951, 12% in 1971 (after the passage of a new anti-drug statute in 1970), 21% in 1973, 
30% in 1988, and 37% in 2002.  Narcotics cases are now the largest single category of 
crime type.  Note also that the mix of drug cases shifted decisively over time from pos-
session to distribution cases.  See Cook et al., supra note 120, at 1586-87 (showing that 
while possession filings decreased from 17% to 14% from 1972 to 1994, distribution 
offenses now make up 74% of all drug cases). 
144 More details about the guilty plea rates in narcotics cases, compared to the rest 
of the pool, appear in the Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 4.  The guilty 
plea rate was 63% in 1956 and 64% in 1961.  Id.; see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 187285, FEDERAL DRUG OFFENDERS, 1999:  WITH TRENDS 
1984-1999, at 8 (2001) (noting that 95% of those defendants charged with a drug of-
fense pled guilty to at least one charge). 
145 Frank Bowman and Michael Heise noted an increased guilty plea rate in drug 
cases in the 1990s.  Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion?  Explaining 
Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1104-05 (2001) 
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in the federal docket, the guilty plea rate for those crimes also came 
much closer to matching the plea rate for other federal crimes. 
The odds of acquittal in narcotics cases also shifted over time.  In 
1950, federal drug cases produced an acquittal rate above the norm 
for that year:  3.3% of narcotics cases versus 2.4% of federal cases 
overall.  Today, drug cases are less likely than the standard federal 
case to end with an acquittal:  0.6% for drug cases versus 0.9% overall 
for 2002.146
Plainly, something happened to federal drug crimes over the 
years.  They became much more numerous, harder for defendants to 
win, and more likely to end with a guilty plea.147  The narcotics cases, 
like the liquor cases in earlier days, drew closer to the norm on guilty 
plea and acquittal rates possibly because of an increasing trial penalty.  
Perhaps the best we can do for now is to ascribe the phenomenal 
growth (one might even call it metastasizing) of drug cases to the 
shifting priorities of federal prosecutors and lawmakers. 
The various types of crimes that influenced the mix of outcomes 
over the years are not limited to liquor and drug cases.  In recent 
years, immigration and weapons cases have become salient, and in 
earlier eras, automobile theft cases had a significant presence.148  In 
each of these instances, the effect of the crime category was notewor-
thy but brief.  Liquor cases dominated the federal scene, but only dur-
ing the 1920s and early 1930s.  Narcotics cases mattered not at all until 
the 1970s, because there were so few of them until that time.  Particu-
(showing that guilty plea rates in drug trafficking cases climbed steadily from 82% in 
1992 to 94.2% in 1999). 
146 According to statistics from the AOUSC, the cases of 80 of the 2,400 narcotics 
defendants in 1950 ended in acquittals.  Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70.  In 
2002, 184 of 29,477 ended in acquittals.  Id.  Because successful motions to suppress 
evidence in drug cases often effectively end the cases by producing dismissals, dismiss-
als as opposed to acquittals might become especially significant dispositions in drug 
cases. 
147 Various features of drug cases that signal their seriousness (such as type of 
drug, amount of drugs, or number of persons involved in the distribution) can only 
explain a small portion of the changes in acquittal and guilty plea rates.  See Bowman & 
Heise, supra note 145, at 1088, 1128 (stating that recent changes in the types of cases 
and defendants prosecuted correlate with prosecutor willingness to engage in plea 
bargaining practices); Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II:  An 
Empirical Analysis of Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 
87 IOWA L. REV. 477, 547 (2002) (discussing how “low-seriousness” drug crimes often 
receive extra sentence discounts beyond what the guidelines dictate). 
148 See Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 4.  Immigration cases affected 
guilty plea and acquittal rates whenever prosecutors filed them in large numbers, but 
these cases appeared in high volume only during the 1940s, the early 1950s, and from 
the mid-1990s to the present.  Id. 
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lar crimes always stay on the leading edge of changes in federal acquit-
tals and guilty pleas, but the identity of such crimes changes often 
across the years. 
D.  Sentence Severity and Trial Penalties in the 1990s 
Sentencing law becomes relevant at the end of a criminal case, af-
ter conviction, but the effects of sentencing radiate back much earlier 
in the case to influence both guilty plea decisions and acquittal out-
comes.  Changes in federal sentencing practices during the 1980s and 
1990s increased the certainty and size of the penalty for going to trial, 
and mightily influenced the guilty plea and acquittal rates during 
those times. 
Given this clear logical connection between sentencing laws and 
guilty plea rates, it makes sense to concentrate on the Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1984 and the massive changes it wrought on federal 
criminal sentencing.  The statute abolished parole, instituted the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, and instructed the Commission to create 
federal sentencing guidelines that would direct the sentencing deci-
sions of federal judges.149
The sentencing guidelines that took effect nationwide in 1989, to-
gether with some important mandatory sentencing laws that Congress 
passed between 1984 and 1989, dramatically shifted the sentencing 
outcomes in federal court.150  Sentences became far more severe:  the 
use of probation withered, and prison terms stretched out.151  Given 
this new severity, some predicted that the sentencing guidelines would 
prompt a catastrophic increase in the trial rate, as defendants facing 
149 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2., 98 Stat. 1837, 
1984; see generally Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law 
Perspective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1991) (noting that a 
federal court must abide by the guidelines created by the Commission unless a depar-
ture is warranted). 
150 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (affirming the constitu-
tionality of the Sentencing Reform Act); Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: 
Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61, 61 
(1993) (“[D]eterminate sentencing schemes and mandatory enhanced sentences have 
largely displaced discretionary sentencing regimes operating within broad sentencing 
constraints.”). 
151 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SENTENCING GUIDELINES:  CENTRAL QUES-
TIONS REMAIN UNANSWERED 19 tbl.1(1992) (showing that among the problems with 
the guidelines identified by judges, attorneys, and probation officers are dehumaniza-
tion, severity, and lack of discretion).  
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such severe sentences would have little to lose by going to trial.152  
Those predictions turned out to be wrong, as guilty plea rates contin-
ued to climb after the guidelines took effect.153
Predictions about the effect of the sentencing guidelines on guilty 
plea rates initially focused on the wrong factor.  The severity of sen-
tences generally matters less in plea bargaining than the size of the dis-
count that a defendant receives for pleading guilty.154  To the extent 
the plea discount is large and certain, guilty pleas will follow; when the 
plea discount is small and uncertain, more trials will occur.155
One key accomplishment of the federal sentencing guidelines was 
to make the plea discounts more certain.  For example, defendants 
typically had to plead guilty to receive the two-level or three-level sen-
152 See Terence Dunworth & Charles D. Weisselberg, Felony Cases and the Federal 
Courts:  The Guidelines Experience, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 99, 151 (1992) (ascribing increased 
trial rates, especially for drug cases, to the implementation of the guidelines and the 
concomitant mandatory minimums and changes in prosecutorial policies); Gerald W. 
Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing:  No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
161, 184 (1991) (“[T]he sentencing data from the selected districts demonstrate that 
the guidelines have reduced the number of defendants pleading guilty even though 
the guidelines have increased the incentive to plead guilty and enhanced the penalty 
for going to trial.”); cf. Reinganum, supra note 59, at 65 (2000) (stating that the game 
theory model suggests that the guidelines will increase average sentence length but not 
the guilty plea rate). 
153
 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines:  A Report on the 
Operation of the Guidelines System and Short-Term Impacts on Disparity in Sentencing, Use of 
Incarceration, and Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining, 66-77(1991) (demonstrat-
ing “the lack of an effect associated with the guidelines on the number and proportion 
of guilty pleas among filed cases.”).  The two-year hiatus in guilty plea rate increase, 
from 1989 to 1990, could be attributed to the uncertainty of the parties over how to 
apply the new rules.  Several Department of Justice policies issued between 1989 and 
1992 attempted to control the use of plea bargains by line prosecutors, and these poli-
cies might help explain the depressed rates of guilty pleas in the 1989-1991 period.  See 
MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 41, at 1014-25 (discussing how even after the adoption 
of the sentencing guidelines, prosecutors continued to engage in charge, fact, and sen-
tence bargains, but were restricted by Attorney General policies).  This theory seems 
tenuous, as rates increased again in 1992, while those policies were still in effect. 
154 See Bibas, supra note 12, at 2504-07 (discussing the effect of discounts on plea 
bargaining); Leipold, supra note 71, at 158  (indicating the effect of probable trial out-
come on bargaining strategy); Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction:  Prosecutors 
as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1258 (2004) (stating that guilty plea rates will con-
tinue to rise if prosecutors have the habit of offering deals the defendant “cannot re-
fuse”). 
155 See Celesta A. Albonetti, Prosecutorial Discretion:  The Effects of Uncertainty, 21 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 291, 295 (1987) (hypothesizing that with increased uncertainty in obtain-
ing a conviction comes a decrease in the chances of prosecution, which in turn de-
creases the number of guilty pleas); Anne M. Heinz & Wayne A. Kerstetter, Pretrial Set-
tlement Conference:  Evaluation of a Reform in Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 349, 
363-64 (1979) (stating that 60% of defendants interviewed said that the prospect of a 
more severe sentence after trial was an important factor in deciding to plead guilty). 
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tence discount for “acceptance of responsibility;”156 about 94% of the 
defendants who pled guilty received the discount while only 8% of the 
defendants who went to trial were given credit at sentencing for ac-
cepting responsibility.157  In a similar vein, prosecutors were highly 
unlikely to recommend a “substantial assistance” departure for defen-
dants who insisted on a trial.158  Other portions of the guilty plea dis-
count were delivered through “guideline factor bargains” (in which 
the parties agree to the applicability of certain adjustments up or 
down in the guideline calculations) and “fact bargains” (in which the 
parties stipulate to the presence of certain facts relevant to the sen-
tence).159
These methods of guaranteeing a plea discount, especially when 
combined with the increased certainty that the judge (now subject to 
appellate review) would remain near the sentence range that the par-
ties recommended, promoted more guilty pleas.  It also appears likely 
that the size of the discount bulked up during the guideline years.160
156 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2004) (setting forth the “Ac-
ceptance of Responsibility” guidelines); see also Michael M. O’Hear, Remorse, Coopera-
tion, and “Acceptance of Responsibility”:  The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 
3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1507, 1513 (1997) (arguing 
that the commission sought to encourage guilty pleas without incurring the disadvan-
tage of automatic sentence discounts, and found acceptance of responsibility discounts 
to be a good solution); Andrew J. Hosmanek,  Beyond Remorse:  True Acceptance of 
Responsibility and a Proposal for the Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines 19-24 (Nov. 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=613687 
(discussing what it means to “accept responsibility” and when this downward adjust-
ment should be, and is most frequently, granted). 
157 More specifically, according to Sentencing Commission data for fiscal year 
2001, 6.1% of defendants pleading guilty or nolo contendere failed to receive a dis-
count for acceptance of responsibility, while 92% of the defendants going to trial failed 
to receive such a discount.  Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70. 
158 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000) (providing courts with limited authority to im-
pose a sentence below the statutory minimum to reflect a defendant’s substantial assis-
tance in the investigation or prosecution of another defendant); U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2004) (describing factors the court may consider when 
determining a substantial assistance departure).  In fiscal year 2001, 17.7% of defen-
dants who pled guilty also received a substantial assistance departure, while 1.7% of 
defendants who went to trial received such a departure sentence.  The specific figures 
appear in the USSC SC01OUT database.  See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70. 
159 See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines:  Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1292-93 (1997) (discussing guideline factor bargains and fact 
bargaining and their use in circumventing the guidelines). 
160 The average prison sentence, in months, imposed in 2001 was 42.5 after a 
guilty or nolo plea, and 138.5 after trial.  These calculations are derived from the USSC 
SC01OUT database.  See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70. 
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The federal guidelines changed more than the size and certainty 
of the trial penalty:  they also changed who controls the penalty.  
Whereas the judge and the prosecutor once competed for control 
over the rewards for pleading guilty, the sentencing guidelines, oper-
ating in a high volume system, shifted more of this control away from 
the judge and toward the prosecutor.  Defense attorneys grumble that 
prosecutors operating under the sentencing guidelines can make it 
virtually impossible to resist a guilty plea offer.161  Judges also observe 
frequently that the sentencing guidelines increased the relative 
strength of the prosecutors and upset the balance of power in the sys-
tem.162  More interestingly, federal judges note that the price of going 
to trial has become so high that it undermines confidence in the ac-
curacy of guilty pleas.163  Academics and journalists make the same ob-
servation in passing.164
161 See Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal 
Criminal Courts:  An Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy Un-
der the Sentencing Guidelines, 92 CAL. L. REV. 425, 482-83 (2004) (explaining that some 
federal defense attorneys have recharacterized the central focus of their jobs as coun-
seling defendants on sentencing consequences, rather than resisting charge and risk-
ing loss of credit for cooperation); Laurie P. Cohen & Gary Fields, Reasonable Doubts:  
How Unproven Allegations Can Lengthen Time in Prison, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2004, at A1 
(quoting a defense attorney as saying, “Probation officers go to town and kill defen-
dants who go to trial . . . .  If you go to trial and lose, you get the book thrown at you—
without having a jury consider all the facts of your case.  It dissuades you from your 
constitutional right to go to trial”). 
162 See MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & SCOTT A. GILBERT, THE U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES: RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER’S 1996 SURVEY 6 (1997), avail-
able at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/gssurvey.pdf (reporting that over 
86% of district judges and chief probation officers either somewhat or strongly agreed 
with the statement, “The Sentencing Guidelines give too much discretion to prosecu-
tors”); KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:  SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN 
THE FEDERAL COURTS 195 n.12 (1998) (listing several articles, essays, and letters writ-
ten by judges that criticize the guidelines). 
163 See United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 288-89 (D. Mass. 2004) (ruling 
that the sentencing guidelines are unconstitutional partly because of the prosecutor 
power to penalize going to trial). 
164 See Lowenthal, supra note 150, at 78 (stating that the threat of filing a charge 
with a mandatory minimum sentence “pressure[s] defendants, who otherwise might 
test the state’s evidence, into accepting guilty pleas”); Robert G. Morvillo & Barry A. 
Bohrer, Checking the Balance:  Prosecutorial Power in an Age of Expansive Legislation, 32 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 137, 137 (1995) (explaining that guidelines give prosecutors “greater 
leverage to virtually compel plea bargaining, force cooperation, and in essence deter-
mine the length of sentences”); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s 
Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2551-54 (2004) (discussing how the costs 
of going to trial affect plea bargaining); Mary Pat Flaherty & Joan Biskupic, Prosecutors 
Can Stack the Deck, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1996, at A1 (describing several cases in which 
the maximum sentence imposed by the federal sentencing guidelines influenced a de-
fendant’s decision to plea bargain); Marc Miller & Ronald Wright, Prosecutor Rex, 
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Recent developments in federal sentencing law accelerated the 
trend toward concentrating the control over the trial penalty in the 
hands of the prosecutor.  In 2003, Congress amended the sentencing 
statutes (in the so-called “Feeney Amendment”) to restrict the power 
of judges to depart from the presumptive guideline sentence, except 
in cases where the prosecutor recommends a discount.165  The same 
law gave prosecutors absolute control over one part of the sentence 
discount for acceptance of responsibility.166
In 2005, another profound change in federal sentencing shifted 
the control back toward a more even balance between the prosecutor 
and the judge.  The Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Booker that 
a sentencing judge cannot increase the presumptive guideline range 
applicable to a defendant unless a jury finds the facts needed to au-
thorize the increased sentence.167  Yet in a remarkable application of 
severability doctrine, the Court also declared that the remedy for this 
unconstitutional application of the guidelines in some cases was to 
treat the guidelines as non-binding in all cases.  Because the guide-
lines are now non-binding, the plea discounts that prosecutors offer to 
defendants are less certain than before.  The judge might or might 
not follow the recommendation for a guideline sentence, leaving de-
fendants less certain about whether a given judge will apply the sen-
tence discounts as expected.168
The federal guidelines were not the only source of changes in sen-
tencing law that affected the price defendants paid for going to trial.  
PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 19, 2003, at A39 (suggesting that large differences between sen-
tences from trials and sentences from plea bargains can unduly sway defendants to-
wards plea bargains). 
165 See Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children 
Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667-76 (de-
tailing when a judge may impose a sentence below the guideline standard).  For com-
mentary on the effects of the PROTECT Act, see Miller, supra note 154, at 1227, which 
notes in particular how the PROTECT Act induced changes in the sentencing guide-
lines regime beyond the original congressional intent); also helpful is Stephanos Bibas, 
The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 297-303 (2004), which predicts that the Feeney 
Amendment will lead to decreased judicial discretion and increased prosecutorial 
power). 
166 PROTECT Act § 401, 117 Stat. at 671-72; see generally Margareth Etienne, Accep-
tance of Responsibility and Plea Bargaining Under the Feeney Amendment, 16 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 109 (2003) (outlining increased options for plea bargaining in light of the new 
legislation).  
167 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
168 The precise contours of this uncertainty will depend on the type of appellate 
review that develops under the “reasonableness” standard of review that the Booker 
court created.  For that standard, see id. at 765. 
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The guidelines took effect in 1989, but the severity of federal sen-
tences increased for many years before that, just as guilty plea in-
creases and acquittal decreases pre-dated the guidelines.169  Over the 
long haul, as the severity of the sentencing options that prosecutors 
could utilize increased, larger plea discounts became possible. 
While acknowledging the more long-term forces at work in the law 
of federal sentencing, we must keep the guidelines at the center of the 
story.  Recall from Figure 2 that acquittals in federal court, while they 
declined throughout the 1980s, began their steepest decline after 
1989.170  The greatest imbalances between acquittals and other out-
comes (including guilty pleas, trial convictions, and dismissals) all ap-
peared in the 1990s.  In short, the federal sentencing guidelines were 
a driving force in the disturbing disappearance of acquittals from the 
system. 
E.  Prosecutor Power as the Leading Acquittal Culprit 
As we have seen, several different features of federal criminal 
practice could have altered guilty plea and acquittal rates over the 
decades.  But it is one thing to know the possible culprits, and another 
thing to know which were the most important and how they inter-
acted.  Furthermore, our list of possible causes for guilty pleas and ac-
quittals is only a partial one. 
How might we estimate which of the many likely causes were most 
important?  One clue comes from longevity.  The effects of particular 
types of crimes (especially narcotics crimes) and procedural complexi-
ties (such as the presence of defense counsel and the expansion of 
pretrial release) were concentrated in fairly small time periods.  The 
effect of prosecutor and judge caseloads, however, worked across 
many decades.  For that reason, caseloads were probably more impor-
tant than crime type or procedural complexity. 
Statistical techniques also allow us to see the relative strength of 
several causes that contribute to a single effect.  A standard statistical 
169 Cf. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 36, at 12 
(indicating an increase in prison sentences prior to 1989).  For indications that guilty 
pleas increased and acquittals decreased before 1989, see supra Figures 1 and 2 and the 
Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app. 1. 
170 One aspect of the federal sentencing guidelines changed the value of partial 
acquittals:  relevant conduct provisions made it more likely that even acquitted con-
duct would still increase the defendant’s sentence.  See Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the 
Jury:  The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. 
L. REV. 33, 93-94 (2003) (describing the limited value of partial acquittals under the 
sentencing guidelines). 
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tool of social scientists known as multiple regression analysis tracks the 
effects of several different factors on an outcome and estimates the 
weight of each factor, while holding constant the influence of the 
others.171  Treating the yearly rates of guilty pleas and acquittals as the 
two “effects” to be explained, multiple regression analyses for the pe-
riod from 1945 to 2002 (set out in the Appendix) confirm that the 
number of prosecutors was the strongest among the potential 
causes.172
The significant influences on the guilty plea rate in a given year 
included the number of federal prosecutors, the number of district 
court judges, and the percentage of immigration crimes prosecuted 
that year.  For acquittal rates, the significant variables included those 
same three factors plus the combined civil and criminal caseload on 
judges. 
Among all the significant variables, prosecutor resources showed 
the largest effects.  A larger number of prosecutors tended to send ac-
quittals down and guilty pleas up.  Meanwhile, the number of judges 
had just the opposite effects:  a larger judiciary produced higher ac-
quittal rates and lower guilty plea rates.  Judges with larger combined 
caseloads had lower acquittal rates. 
Why would more prosecutors—presumably with more time to de-
vote to the available cases—tend to produce more guilty pleas and 
fewer acquittals (even after controlling for the number and complex-
ity of criminal cases terminated in a given year)?  This may be a sign 
that when the Department of Justice hired new prosecutors, they 
added to the quantity more than the quality of cases. 
Another relationship among the possible causes of these out-
comes deserves close attention as well:  the positive and negative signs 
for the judge variables point in the opposite direction from the signs 
for the prosecutor variables.  Every prosecutor positive finds a match-
ing judicial negative, and vice versa.  This polarity—additional judges 
and prosecutors had opposite effects on both the acquittal rate and 
171 For a more complete description of regression analysis, see MICHAEL O. 
FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 323-29 (1990).  The two regres-
sions presented in the Appendix to this Article are weighted least squares regressions 
because the number of cases terminated in each year varied, making the percentages 
for some years more reliable than others.  
172 There is some risk of multi-collinearity in the use of annual data.  For that rea-
son, the regression in the Appendix explores a minimal number of variables and its 
results should be interpreted cautiously. 
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guilty plea rate—speaks volumes about the accuracy hypothesis.173  If 
additional prosecutors were presenting stronger and more convincing 
cases at trial, the addition of new judges to preside over these suppos-
edly more reliable cases should not cause an increase in the acquittal 
rate.  Instead, the extra judges would make it possible to achieve more 
trial convictions in these higher quality cases. 
Granted, it is conceivable that extra judges made trials less accu-
rate, perhaps by giving unwarranted consideration to defense motions 
to exclude reliable but improperly obtained evidence.174  But this ex-
planation of the statistical polarity between prosecutors and judges 
requires us to believe that judges acted against type for many decades.  
The aspiration of the trial judge in an adversary system is to promote 
justice through accurate factual findings. 
Statistical analysis indicating judges and prosecutors working at 
cross purposes, and prosecutors exerting the larger influence, does 
not speak well for the overall accuracy of the system.  In a world where 
additional prosecutors and judges have opposite effects, it seems more 
likely that new prosecutors add new (probably weaker) cases to the 
system and keep the guilty plea rate high by increasing the size or cer-
tainty of the guilty plea discount. 
The interaction of the limited number of factors explored so far 
tells us that guilty plea rates move higher and acquittal rates move 
lower when prosecutors have the time to push them there.  The dis-
placed acquittal is a marker of prosecutorial opportunity and power. 
The factors discussed so far do not exhaust the possibilities.  For 
one thing, we have reviewed potential causes internal to the criminal 
justice system (such as the legal rules and resources available to the 
parties), but no factors external to the system.  For instance, changing 
crime rates or the type of crime politics at work in a particular era 
might give prosecutors different attitudes about guilty pleas.175  Judges 
under different social conditions might prove more or less willing to 
reward defendants for pleading guilty. 
Many social conditions could affect the pool of potential jurors, 
making them less inclined to acquit.  Public attitudes toward crime 
173 Cf. FISHER, supra note 22, at 116-24 (arguing that caseload pressures on judges 
made them more amenable to plea bargaining). 
174 See PIZZI, supra note 53, at 69-72, 222-23 (1999) (contending that a defendant’s 
ability to suppress essential evidence through procedure is symptomatic of a weak trial 
system). 
175 See generally TED GEST, CRIME & POLITICS (2001) (describing the interaction 
between policymaking and crime control); STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF 
STREET CRIME (1990) (discussing how politics can affect the criminal process). 
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changed over the years, and very well could have affected the pattern 
of outcomes in federal court.  Over the last few decades in particular, 
there has been a hardening of public attitudes about crime.176  Such a 
shift of attitudes might have encouraged guilty pleas and made acquit-
tals more difficult to achieve. 
Some additional factors “internal” to criminal justice, such as the 
role of defense counsel or particular types of sentence discounts, also 
have received only passing attention so far.  Surely, then, our brief 
look at the federal criminal docket over the decades could benefit 
from a closer look.  Part IV takes a more detailed tour of the possible 
causes for guilty plea and acquittal rates in the federal districts during 
the remarkable recent period from 1994 to 2002. 
IV.  LEGAL ENVIRONMENTS HOSTILE TO INNOCENCE 
The federal criminal system divides into ninety-four distinct dis-
tricts, each sharing some common features.  Every district implements 
the same federal statutes defining crimes, adjudication procedures, 
and sentences, and each follows the same policies set by “Main Justice” 
in Washington, D.C., for the entire Department.177  The U.S. Attor-
ney’s Offices also operate under centralized budgetary constraints 
from Congress, money that the legislature sometimes uses to encour-
age particular priorities for investigation and prosecution.178
But each of the ninety-four federal districts also has much auton-
omy, and each produces its own distinctive brand of federal justice.  
The United States Attorney for each district makes all the hiring deci-
176 See Austin Sarat & Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth 
Amendment:  Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 171, 175-76 (finding dra-
matic growth in public support for capital punishment from 1966 to 1976); Tom R. 
Tyler & Robert J. Boeckmann, Three Strikes and You Are Out, But Why?  The Psychology of 
Public Support for Punishing Rule Breakers, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 237, 257 (1997) (stating 
that public support of punishment has increased over the last forty to fifty years); cf. 
Neil Vidmar, Retribution and Revenge, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 31, 
41-57 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001) (exploring the sociological and 
psychological functions that punishment serves). 
177 A few federal districts must process a distinctive set of crimes because of the 
presence of Indian reservations or large government installations such as military 
bases.  See Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1996) (providing instruction for the 
sentencing of crimes, not otherwise punishable, that are committed within federal ju-
risdictions). 
178 See generally Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, 
and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 793-99 (1999) (describing how Con-
gress’s budgetary powers can influence criminal enforcement decision making).  For 
an example in the arena of weapons crimes, see Daniel C. Richman, “Project Exile” and 
the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement Authority, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 392-96 (2001). 
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sions for local attorneys and support staff, and allocates resources to 
respond to the priorities of the district.  The prosecutors in each dis-
trict interact with a defense bar with a distinctive local character,179 
and they encounter trial judges with individual priorities and habits, 
along with the life tenure to protect that individuality.180
This setting creates the conditions for a natural experiment.181  
While holding constant the basic legal framework from district to dis-
trict, the environment changes as prosecutorial policies and habits of 
working groups shift from place to place.  Tracking these environ-
mental changes allows us to see which of them contribute to high 
guilty plea and low acquittal rates.182
This Part explores some key characteristics of the ninety-four fed-
eral districts between 1994 and 2002.  Although the time frame is 
much shorter than that in our previous inquiry, it covers most of the 
era of the sentencing guidelines—an era that, as we have seen, pro-
duced levels of guilty pleas and acquittals extreme enough to sound a 
clear warning.  The inquiry now becomes narrower but deeper.183
Patterns of outcomes in the districts reveal some of the particular 
sentencing laws that have contributed most clearly to the drop in ac-
quittals over the last decade.  Departures from the sentencing guide-
lines based on a defendant’s “substantial assistance” made a measur-
able difference.  The same was true of the three-level “super 
acceptance of responsibility” discount.  Where these methods—largely 
179 Some attorneys are privately retained, some are in private practice appointed 
by the court under the Criminal Justice Act (“CJA panel attorneys”), and others are 
staff attorneys for the Federal Public Defender. 
180 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior 
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior . . . .”). 
181 Others have taken advantage of this natural experiment opportunity in explor-
ing other questions relating to federal criminal justice.  See Bowman & Heise, Quiet Re-
bellion, supra note 145, at 1126 (investigating factors that influence the length of fed-
eral drug sentences); Bowman & Heise, Quiet Rebellion II, supra note 147, at 554-58 
(investigating further the factors that influence the length of federal drug sentences); 
Michael Edmund O’Neill, When Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial Declina-
tions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 249-71 (2004) (exploring prosecutorial decisions to 
refuse to pursue indictment). 
182 Cf. J. Fred Springer, Burglary and Robbery Plea Bargaining in California:  An Organ-
izational Perspective, 8 JUST. SYS. J. 157, 182-84 (1983) (conducting a three-county study 
that isolated environmental factors contributing to different guilty plea practices). 
183 The shorter study period also makes it practical to consider a longer list of po-
tential causes based on consistent data sources.  Unless otherwise indicated, the dis-
trict-level data in this Part are compiled from case-level data assembled by the AOUSC 
or the U.S. Sentencing Commission (the AOUSC ADJOUT and USSC SCOUT data-
bases).  See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70.  Many of the variables studied 
here are not available in consistent and convenient formats prior to fiscal year 1994. 
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controlled by prosecutors—were used most commonly, they contrib-
uted to an environment in the district that convinced defendants to 
plead guilty and to opt out of trials that might have ended in acquit-
tals.  More generally, the prosecutor’s willingness to decrease the of-
fense level under the guidelines resulted in more guilty pleas and 
fewer acquittals. 
Identifying the effects of sentencing devices such as these points 
the way to a more healthy sentencing law down the road.  Sentencing 
discounts resting solely in the hands of prosecutors, such as substan-
tial assistance departures, create the greatest threat of trial distortion.  
The size of the trial penalty can remain reasonably small and relatively 
uncertain—as it should be—only if judges retain some authority to 
disagree with prosecutors about proposed discounts.  Rules that des-
ignate judges as legitimate counterweights to prosecutors create a 
separation of powers for sentencing, a state of affairs that holds the 
best hope for reliable and accurate criminal justice. 
A.  Environmental Audits 
The two separate regression analyses constructed here use two dif-
ferent “dependent variables” (the phenomena that are caused by the 
“independent variables”).184  The percentage of guilty pleas and the 
percentage of acquittals in a particular district for a given year occupy 
the center of attention, because a key indicator of trial distortion hap-
pens when guilty plea rates rise while acquittal rates fall.185
The independent variables (that is, the potential causes of 
change) fall under several different headings.  A first group of vari-
ables attempts to measure the workload that the key actors must carry.  
They track the number of cases that each prosecutor and judge han-
184 Because the dependent variables for the two studies are expressed as percent-
ages, I use a weighted least squares regression to account for the different volume of 
cases in each district.  The weighting variable, the number of defendants in each dis-
trict for each fiscal year whose cases were terminated, is found in the Judicial Business 
Annual Report of the AOUSC, at Table D-7.  See AOUSC JUDICIAL BUS. ANN. REP. tbl.D-
7 (1994-1997); AOUSC JUDICIAL BUS. ANN. REP. tbl.D-7 (1998-2002) available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc.judbus.html.   
185 I omitted the Middle District of Georgia for every year in the study because of 
its extremely high number of acquittals, which is a product of the large number of traf-
fic offenses prosecuted as federal misdemeanors in that district.  In a unique arrange-
ment, the federal courts process all traffic violations that occur on two large military 
bases in the district.  Leipold, supra note 71, at 192.  Data was often unavailable for at 
least one variable in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the Northern Mariana 
Islands; because the weighted least squares regression in Table 2 uses a crosswise delete 
method, these districts are not included in the study. 
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dled in each district for each year.186  The average number of days de-
voted to each criminal trial also could affect the workload of the ac-
tors and the willingness of the parties to go to trial.187  Perhaps the 
busy prosecutor with a heavier caseload is less anxious to take a case to 
trial (particularly if the average trial lasts many days) and thus will be 
more cooperative in plea negotiations or will increase the discount for 
pleading guilty.188  Those steeper discounts could convince more de-
fendants to plead guilty, including a number who otherwise might 
have been acquitted. 
A second group of variables estimates the influence of the leader-
ship within each prosecutor’s office.  One variable shows the years in 
office of each U.S. Attorney, and another the political party of the 
President who appointed each U.S. Attorney.189  After the lead prose-
cutor in a district takes office and enacts new office practices, attor-
neys in the district should become more certain as to how various 
types of cases will be handled, and the number of guilty pleas should 
increase. 
A third set of variables tracks various resources and characteristics 
of the defendant.  The average number of “criminal history points” of 
186 The AOUSC calculates a “weighted” criminal caseload per judge for each dis-
trict in each fiscal year, appearing in its Judicial Business Annual Report, Table X-1A.  
See AOUSC JUDICIAL BUS. ANN. REP. 1994-2002, supra note 184, at tbl.X-1A.  The 
prosecutor workload is necessarily a more crude figure, obtained by dividing the num-
ber of defendants whose cases were terminated in the district by the number of AUSAs 
working in the district that year. 
187 Figures that form the basis for this average in each district for each fiscal year 
appear in the Judicial Business Annual Report, Table T-2.  See id. at tbl.T-2.  For details 
on the calculation of this figure, see the Statistical Appendix, supra note 13, at app.3. 
188 See Bowman & Heise, Quiet Rebellion II, supra note 147, at 552 (concluding that 
prosecutor workload correlated with sentence reductions in drug cases).  Richard Boy-
lan and Cheryl Long explored drug cases from 1993 to 1996 and concluded that 
prosecutors from the largest and smallest offices are the ones most likely to go to trial, 
while average-size offices are more likely to produce guilty pleas.  They postulate that 
prosecutors in settings where monitoring is difficult will be more likely to go to trial to 
develop their “human capital” in trial skills.  See Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, 
Size, Monitoring, and Plea Rate:  An Examination of United States Attorneys 1 (July 
10, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/0089.pdf 
(studying the effectiveness of monitoring and its effect on U.S. Attorney performance 
by examining plea rates). 
189 In calculating the tenure of U.S. Attorneys, the year of appointment was desig-
nated as a 0, and one point added for each additional year in office.  U.S. Attorneys 
appointed by Republican Presidents were coded as 1, and those by Democratic Presi-
dents as 0.  Information about the appointment of U.S. Attorneys was located on 
http://thomas.loc.gov.  See Richard T. Boylan, Salaries, Turnover, and Performance in the 
Federal Criminal Justice System, 47 J.L. & ECON. 75, 87 (2004) (demonstrating the use of 
U.S. Attorney tenure as an independent variable and showing that longer tenure in-
creased the guilty plea rate). 
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defendants sentenced in a district might indicate the amount of ex-
perience those defendants have with the criminal justice system, and 
could affect the willingness of the judge and prosecutor to discount a 
sentence.190  Federal prosecutors have relatively little control over the 
criminal history points that figure into a defendant’s sentence.191  As a 
result, this variable presents a test of the accuracy hypothesis:  a dis-
trict with more serious, high-priority repeat criminals to prosecute 
ought to produce fewer acquittals.  Increasingly accurate prosecutors 
would emphasize quality over quantity, and their district would con-
tribute more than its share to a declining acquittal rate. 
Because defendants who are detained until the date of trial are 
considered more likely to plead guilty,192 another variable notes the 
percentage of defendants in a district who are released before trial.193  
The percentage of defendants in a district who are Hispanic, black, or 
female also go into the model.194
Another defendant resource to consider is the type of counsel 
working on the case.195  An unusual number of defendants in the fed-
eral system retain private counsel, and in many settings it might be 
190 The average criminal history points for defendants sentenced in each district 
for each fiscal year came from databases of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, using the 
TOTCHPTS variable.  See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70. 
191 The prosecutor might make some adjustments at the margins, but prior record 
has more or less the same effect regardless of any negotiated agreements.  There are 
some limited exceptions to this observation:  for example, prosecutors do have more 
practical control on the use of “armed career criminal” and “career criminal” en-
hancements.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1, .4 (2004) (outlining 
sentencing ranges under these enhancements).  These enhancements apply in rela-
tively few cases.  As we will see, the usage of career criminal enhancements in a district 
had no significant effect on guilty pleas or acquittals.  See Table 3.  The percent of ca-
reer criminal enhancements applied in each district during each fiscal year was calcu-
lated based on the Sentencing Commission database, CAROFFAP variable.  See Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, supra note 70. 
192 See Compelling Appearance in Court, supra note 132, at 1031; supra note 129 and 
accompanying text. 
193 See Bibas, supra note 12, at 2491-93 (discussing the impact of bail and pretrial 
detention on guilty pleas); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (2000); Salerno, supra  note 134; 
supra, notes 131, 134 and accompanying text. 
194 Other scholars have noted a racial differential in the decision to plead guilty.  
See Celesta A. Albonetti, Race and the Probability of Pleading Guilty, 6 J. QUANTITATIVE 
CRIMINOLOGY 315, 332 (1990) (finding that black defendants are, in some circum-
stances, less likely to plead guilty). 
195 The percentage of cases in each district defended by Criminal Justice Act panel 
attorneys, Federal Public Defender attorneys, or private attorneys (along with the per-
centage of cases involving waiver of attorney) can be found in the AOUSC ADJOUT 
database, using the FLCOUNSL variable. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70. 
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reasonable to expect stronger results from private attorneys.196  How-
ever, the appointed attorneys in the federal system are exceptionally 
well-trained and well-funded, so it is just as plausible that the type of 
counsel used in a federal district does not affect that district’s guilty 
plea or acquittal rates. 
The next group of variables explores the types of crimes charged 
in each district.  These include the percentage of drug crimes, violent 
crimes, theft and fraud crimes, weapon crimes, and immigration 
crimes terminated annually in each district.197  As an overall estimate 
of the seriousness of the crimes charged, one variable calculates the 
average “offense level” under the federal sentencing guidelines for de-
fendants sentenced in the district.198
In contrast to the variable for criminal history points, the offense 
level tells us more about the prosecutor’s discretionary choices than 
about the raw material that the docket presents in a district.  When it 
comes to the offense level to be assigned, the federal prosecutor has 
enormous discretion.199  If the average offense level in a district affects 
196 Privately retained attorneys are generally believed to be more likely to go to 
trial and to obtain acquittals.  See COMM. REPORT ON POVERTY, supra note 125, at 29 
(citing statistics from various districts showing that “pleas of guilty are entered much 
more frequently by defendants with assigned counsel than those represented by private 
counsel”); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and 
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 35 & nn.123-24 (1997) (pointing to studies that show 
that defendants with appointed counsel are more successful). 
197 The types of crimes terminated in each district for each fiscal year are available 
in the AOUSC ADJOUT database, using the TIGRON variable, which classifies all 
crimes according to a six-variable classification system of the Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics.  See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70. 
 The U.S. Sentencing Commission, in its 1995 Annual Report, hypothesized that 
guilty pleas were increasing because of an increase in immigration and fraud cases.  See 
1995 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 51, available at http:// 
www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1995/ch5_95.pdf (identifying lower trial rates for these types 
of cases as contributing to the overall reduction in total trial rates and subsequent in-
crease in the national plea rate).  But George Fisher points out that the increased plea 
rates in drug cases over time is a better explanation.  FISHER, supra note 22, at 344 
n.77.  Sara Beale has noted that guilty pleas for gun cases are increasing in number as 
the severity of sentences imposed for those crimes increases.  See Sara Sun Beale, The 
Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties:  Shooting Down the Commerce Clause 
and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1677 (showing prosecutors’ inclina-
tion to use enhanced penalties as a “bargaining chip”). 
198 The average offense level for each district in each fiscal year was calculated 
based on the database from the U.S. Sentencing Commission, using the XFOLSOR 
variable.  See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70. 
199 Cf. David Yellen, Probation Officers Look at Plea Bargaining, and Do Not Like What 
They See, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 339, 339 (1996) (reporting that about 40% of probation 
officers believe that guideline calculations set forth in plea agreements in a majority of 
cases are not supported by offense facts). 
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the guilty plea or acquittal rates, that should reflect both the raw ma-
terials available to the prosecutors (giving us some reason to credit the 
accuracy hypothesis) and the negotiating power of prosecutors (giving 
us reason to believe the trial distortion theory). 
More clear-cut tests for the trial distortion theory come from vari-
ables that more directly measure the perceived guilty plea discount 
that defendants encounter as they decide whether to proceed with 
trial.200  These address some of the most well-known methods that 
prosecutors have to reward cooperative defendants, including sen-
tencing departures for those who provide “substantial assistance” to 
the government,201 and the enhanced three-point discount for defen-
dants who fully accept responsibility for their crimes.202  The rate of 
judicial downward departures from the sentencing guidelines could 
also reveal efforts to reward defendants for pleading guilty.203
Two other blunt measures of the trial penalty try to capture the 
differential between the sentence after trial and the sentence after a 
guilty plea:  one variable looks to the additional proportion of prison 
200 Another potential measure of the prosecutor’s power to create a guilty plea 
discount is the percentage of charges filed under statutes carrying mandatory mini-
mum sentences, under such statutes as 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (B) (2000) 
(narcotics amounts); 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (2000) (telephone count); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 
(2000) (use of firearm).  However, because the discounting effect of mandatory mini-
mum charges can be achieved either by filing the charges and dismissing them later, 
or by threatening to file the charges, this model does not track mandatory minimum 
charges filed. 
201 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2004).  The percentage of 
cases in each district receiving the substantial assistance departure is available in the 
Annual Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics of the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion (for 1996-2002), available at www.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm, tbl.30, and in the Annual 
Report of the Commission (for 1995), available at www.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm.   
202 During the period 1994-2002, judges retained final authority over the reward-
ing of the three-point AR discount, but they relied heavily on prosecutors to determine 
whether the plea of guilty arrived early enough to save the necessary resources.  The 
percentage of cases in each district for each fiscal year receiving a three-point discount 
for AR is calculated based on the USSC SCOUT database, using the ACCTRESP vari-
able.  See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70. 
203 The percentage of cases receiving a judicial downward departure in each dis-
trict is available from the Annual Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics and the 
Annual Report of the Sentencing Commission.  Other studies have treated departure 
sentences as dependent variables.  See Jeffrey T. Ulmer & John H. Kramer, Court Com-
munities Under Sentencing Guidelines:  Dilemmas of Formal Rationality and Sentencing Dispar-
ity, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 383, 385-86, 402-04 (1996) (exploring downward departures in 
three Pennsylvania counties and finding that formal rational factors interact with ex-
tralegal criteria deemed relevant by local court actors, and that legally-sanctioned sen-
tencing criteria are intertwined with defendants’ race and gender and exercise of trial 
rights). 
144 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 79 
 
sentences imposed when defendants go to trial, while the other meas-
ures the longer duration of prison sentences imposed after trial.204
Finally, several variables estimate the influence of different circuit 
courts on the guilty plea and acquittal rates, after controlling for the 
other case characteristics described above.205  Differences among the 
circuits might reflect distinctive legal rules imposed by the appellate 
courts, or they could capture regional differences in courtroom prac-
tices and cultural differences in regions of the country that could 
translate into different acquittal or guilty plea rates. 
The results of the two regression analyses—one for guilty plea 
rates and one for acquittal rates—appear in Table 3. 
 
204 The differential for each district between the sentencing result after trial and 
after a guilty plea is calculated based on the AOUSC ADJOUT database.  The figures 
are available through a cross-tabulation of the DISPOSIT variable and the TOTPRISN 
variable (for duration) or the SENTENCE variable (for prison percentage).  See Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics, supra note 70. 
 Because the cases going to trial may not be randomly selected, it is possible that 
any difference in the sentences attached to the cases in the guilty plea and trial pools is 
not actually a discount for pleading guilty.  It may instead show that one or the other 
of the pools involves more serious crimes.  See FISHER, supra note 23, at 345 n.85 (inves-
tigating severity of the crime as a sentencing differential); Richard S. Frase, Implement-
ing Commission-Based Sentencing Guidelines:  The Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 
2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 279, 287-337 (1993) (analyzing the duration of the sen-
tence as a function of offense severity); Terence D. Miethe & Charles A. Moore, Socio-
economic Disparities Under Determinate Sentencing Systems:  A Comparison of Preguideline and 
Postguideline Practices in Minnesota, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 337, 337-63 (1985) (showing that 
even under determinate sentencing schemes, there will be differences in sentence du-
ration that can be attributed to the severity of the offense).  Note that offense level, 
prior criminal record, and several other case features are controlled in this study. 
205 The circuits were coded as categorical variables, and the regressions presented 
in Table 2 used the Fifth Circuit as the reference category.  Because the circuits are 
categorical variables, the standardized coefficients for the circuits only allow compari-
sons between the size of impact relative to other circuits; no comparisons with other 
factors are possible. 
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Table 3:  Weighted Regression of Annual District-Level Guilty Plea 
and Acquittal Rates, on Factors Related to Case Processing  
and Prosecutorial Discretion, Federal  
Criminal Cases, 1994-2002 
 
 Guilty Plea %  Acquittal %   
 Coefficient Standardized  t Coefficient Standardized  t 
Caseload Factors:       
Prosecutor 
Criminal Caseload  
 8.735E-05  0.031  0.980 -5.16E-06 -0.008 -0.186 
Judge 
Criminal Caseload  
-4.25E-05 -0.165** -3.300  3.203E-06  0.051  0.800 
Average Trial Days  -4.75E-03 -0.139** -4.030  1.540E-04  0.019  0.421 
Prosecutor Office Leadership Factors:     
U.S. Attorney  
Tenure 
 3.601E-04  0.020  0.829 -1.44E-04 -0.032 -1.070 
U.S. Attorney  
Political Party 
 3.974E-03  0.038  1.469 -1.31E-03 -0.052 -1.564 
Defendant Factors:         
Black %  4.466E-02  0.201**  3.710 -1.295E-02 -0.238** -3.440 
Hispanic %   3.726E-02  0.206*  2.482 -4.84E-03 -0.126 -1.182 
Female %   5.035E-02  0.046  1.339  2.613E-03  0.010  0.224 
Pretrial Release %  5.930E-03  0.023  0.692 -5.75E-03 -0.091* -2.162 
Counsel Private %  -5.85E-03 -0.019 -0.454  7.147E-03  0.094  1.786 
Counsel FPD %   1.708E-02  0.073  1.626 -2.76E-03 -0.049 -0.847 
Counsel CJA % -6.32E-03 -0.022 -0.556 -1.10E-03 -0.016 -0.311 
Criminal History 
Points, Average 
 5.186E-03  0.125**  3.331 -1.14E-03 -0.114* -2.361 
Career Criminal 
Enhancement % 
 7.542E-02  0.033  0.922 -3.38E-02 -0.064 -1.407 
Crime Type Factors:         
Offense Level,  
Average 
-9.96E-03 -0.521** -11.583  7.138E-04  0.154**  2.673 
Drug Crime % -2.49E-02 -0.070 -1.473  7.076E-03  0.082  1.346 
Violent Crime % -3.83E-02 -0.033 -1.087  1.524E-02  0.054  1.394 
Theft-Fraud Crime %  -5.89E-02 -0.145** -3.253  8.137E-03  0.083  1.446 
Weapon Crime %  -0.131 -0.129** -3.870  1.237E-02  0.050  1.177 
Immigration Crime %  -1.47E-02 -0.048 -0.612 -1.08E-02  -0.144 -1.454 
 
146 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 79 
Table 3 (cont’d) 
 
 Guilty Plea %  Acquittal %  
 Coefficient Standardized t Coefficient Standardized  t 
Plea Discount Factors:       
Substantial Assistance  
Departure % 
 8.117E-02  0.117**   5.591 -2.18E-02 -0.196** -4.840 
Acceptance of 
Responsibility % 
 0.260  0.663** 15.952 -3.99E-02 -0.418** -7.870 
Judicial Downward  
Departure % 
 3.097E-03  0.010   0.233 -1.48E-03 -0.020 -0.360 
Prison %, 
Trial Differential 
 5.471E-02  0.111**    3.562 -2.86E-02 -0.239** -5.992 
Prison Duration, 
Trial Differential 
 5.554E-05  0.052*   2.226 -7.48E-06 -0.029  -0.965 
Regional Factors:         
1st Circuit  9.453E-03  0.027   0.995  7.022E-03  0.084*  2.381 
2d Circuit  2.089E-02  0.125**  3.592 -1.20E-03 -0.030 -0.666 
3d Circuit  2.942E-05  0.000   0.015  2.056E-03  0.041  1.070 
4th Circuit -1.16E-02 -0.087*  -2.165  5.517E-03  0.171**  3.316 
6th Circuit -1.15E-04 -0.001 -0.022  5.882E-03  0.149**  3.616 
7th Circuit -1.84E-03 -0.008 -0.310 -3.38E-03 -0.063  -1.829 
8th Circuit  2.994E-03  0.016  0.520  2.799E-03  0.062   1.567 
9th Circuit  1.831E-02  0.173**  3.256 -3.25E-03 -0.130  -1.862 
10th Circuit  1.269E-02  0.071*  2.372 -3.48E-04 -0.080 -0.210 
11th Circuit -1.96E-02 -0.140* -4.360  8.093E-03  0.238**   5.810 
Constant  0.943  51.606  3.460E-02   6.096 
Adjusted R Square  0.663    0.449   
 
N = 704, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
B.  Trials and Tribulations by the Numbers 
For readers unfamiliar with regression analysis, a brief guide is in 
order.  The key entries in Table 3 appear in bold under the “Stan-
dardized” column for each of the two studies (one for guilty pleas and 
one for acquittals).  The standardized coefficient allows a reader to 
compare the relative size of the impact that various factors have on 
the dependent variable.206  A larger standardized coefficient (either in 
a positive or negative direction) indicates a stronger effect of that 
 
206 See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 171, at 324 (explaining how to interpret 
coefficients). 
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variable on guilty pleas or acquittals in the districts.  The positive or 
negative sign of each standardized coefficient is also worth noting:  a 
negative sign means that when the independent variable in that row 
increases, guilty plea rates decrease (or acquittal rates decrease for the 
right-hand column of standardized coefficients).  A positive sign 
means that when the factor in question increases, guilty plea or ac-
quittal rates also increase.  The variables worthy of attention appear in 
bold typeface; they produced effects clear enough to leave us confi-
dent that the patterns were not merely a product of chance. 
The variables that deserve attention first are those that demon-
strate a statistically significant impact on both guilty plea and acquittal 
rates.  Two such variables offer some of the most clear-cut signs of 
prosecutor influence.  The first is the enhanced three-point “accep-
tance of responsibility” sentence discount (or “super AR” for short).  
The connection between guilty pleas and an ordinary two-point AR 
discount is not surprising, as virtually all defendants who plead guilty 
receive the discount and virtually none who lose at trial receive it.207  
But federal prosecutors powerfully influence the super AR discount; 
until recently, the guideline language required the defendant to pro-
vide “timely” and “complete” information to the government “con-
cerning his own involvement in the offense.”208  This timely notice had 
to be early enough to permit the government to avoid trial prepara-
tion.  For all these preconditions to the award of the extra discount, 
the court relied on factual representations from the government.209  
As Table 3 shows, in districts where the prosecutors more frequently 
request this discount, guilty plea rates tend to be higher.  Even more 
revealing is the conclusion that acquittal rates tend to be lower in dis-
tricts where super AR is used heavily. 
“Substantial assistance” departures also affect both the guilty plea 
and acquittal rates.  The positive effect on guilty plea rates confirms 
other scholars’ work showing how prosecutors use these departures to 
encourage guilty pleas.210  Even more dispiriting is the effect of sub-
207 See supra text accompanying notes 156-57. 
208 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E.1(b)(1) (2002) (allowing an 
additional level of sentence discount). 
209 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) (2004) (requiring motion 
from the government).  This guideline was amended to allow the third discount level 
in 1992.  In 2003, Congress directly amended this provision to place control of the dis-
count completely in the hands of the prosecution. 
210 See Frank O. Bowman, III, Departing Is Such Sweet Sorrow:  A Year of Judicial Revolt 
on “Substantial Assistance” Departures Follows a Decade of Prosecutorial Indiscipline, 29 STET-
SON L. REV. 7, 13-16 (1999) (showing that defendants are more willing to cooperate 
with the government when the government files more substantial assistance motions). 
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stantial assistance departures on acquittal rates:  districts with high 
levels of such departures also tended to show lower rates of acquittals.  
Prosecutors are not using their substantial assistance departures only 
to avoid the easy trials where a conviction was nearly inevitable. 
The contrast between the effects of prosecutor versus judicial de-
partures is instructive.  The rate of judicial downward departures in a 
district had no significant effect on either guilty plea or acquittal rates 
in the district.  These departure variables, when combined, give us 
some reason to believe that prosecutor choices matter more than ju-
dicial choices in setting the price of trials. 
Another variable offers an unobstructed view of trial distortion at 
work:  the differential between the percentage of prison sentences 
imposed after trial and after a guilty plea.  According to Table 3, dis-
tricts with a larger differential in the percentage of prison sentences 
imposed (that is, districts with a larger average plea discount) were 
likely to have lower acquittal rates and higher guilty plea rates.  Even 
after controlling for type of crime, offense level, and other features of 
a district’s caseload, the prospects of receiving a prison sentence after 
trial remained an important influence on the decision by defendants 
to give up their defenses.211  For the last decade in the federal system, 
inducements like these were effective in the weakest cases where juries 
might otherwise have acquitted. 
A pair of variables, when considered together, sheds further light 
on prosecutor influence:  the average offense level for crimes in the 
district, and the average criminal history points assigned to convicted 
defendants in the district.  These outcomes deserve special attention 
because they run in opposite directions, both for guilty pleas and ac-
quittals.  Higher offense levels generate lower guilty plea rates, while 
higher criminal history scores lead to higher guilty plea rates.  Con-
versely, higher offense levels send acquittal rates up, but higher crimi-
nal history scores drive acquittal rates down. 
This pattern is meaningful because prosecutors have more control 
over offense levels than offender criminal history.  Through the rele-
vant conduct rules, prosecutors choose whether or not to marshal the 
evidence for factual findings that increase the range permitted by the 
guidelines.  The offender’s criminal history, which the court is more 
likely to figure into a defendant’s sentence regardless of the prosecu-
tor’s choices in constructing the case, has effects more consistent with 
211 A related measure of sentence severity, the difference between the length of 
prison terms imposed after guilty pleas and the length of terms imposed after trial, 
significantly influenced guilty pleas but not acquittals. 
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the accuracy hypothesis.  Districts that process defendants who pre-
sent more serious criminal histories also produce lower acquittal rates, 
suggesting that judges and prosecutors in these districts value quality 
over quantity and put extra effort into avoiding acquittals for these 
high-priority defendants.212
Just the opposite, however, holds true for offense levels.  The dis-
tricts with the highest average offense levels also had the lowest guilty 
plea rates and highest acquittal rates.  If prosecutors in these districts 
simply faced more objectively serious criminal conduct, an increas-
ingly accurate system would require prosecutors to prioritize resources 
to these cases and drive the acquittal rates down.  Lower offense levels 
produce higher guilty plea rates, suggesting that prosecutors in these 
districts work with defendants to reduce the offense level calculations 
under the guidelines to induce a guilty plea. 
The criminal caseloads of prosecutors and judges mattered less 
over the last decade than they did over the longer period considered 
in Part III.  After controlling for other features of the cases on a dis-
trict’s docket, the prosecutors’ caseloads in a district did not affect ei-
ther the guilty plea or acquittal rate.  Heavier judicial criminal 
caseloads and longer trials (a proxy for the complexity of cases) both 
had a negative effect on guilty plea rates, but no significant effect on 
acquittal rates.  These variables might identify districts where local at-
titudes are more favorable to trials (thus producing higher weighted 
judicial workloads and lower guilty plea rates simultaneously).  There 
is not much evidence here to suggest that judges are influencing 
guilty plea rates, be it out of concern for docket control or for other 
reasons.213
Two variables relating to defendant demographics also tip the 
scales towards a trial distortion theory.  Black defendants were less 
likely than white defendants to be acquitted and more likely to plead 
guilty, holding other caseload features constant.  Districts with more 
Hispanic defendants also had higher levels of guilty pleas.  Given the 
limited number of defendant characteristics captured in this model, 
the defendant’s race or ethnicity might reflect differences of income, 
212 See supra Part II.C.3 for an explanation of the relationship between quality and 
quantity in criminal case processing. 
213 As Table 3 shows, more pretrial releases in a district lead to fewer acquittals 
(even though the defendant is available to assist with the defense).  One might inter-
pret this finding as good news:  federal prosecutors, to their credit, are not taking any 
tactical advantages that might arise from a defendant being detained before trial. 
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education, or other personal characteristics.214  Still, the race and eth-
nicity variables do suggest that offender demographics influence plea 
negotiations and outcomes, which is consistent with studies that have 
focused more closely on how these factors distort the operation of 
more legally relevant factors.215
Statistics about the litigation resources and outcomes for each of 
the federal districts give us only a partial view of the rich reality of fed-
eral courthouses; this view, however, is from a new vantage point that 
allows a view of things not easily visible from ground level.  The statis-
tics on court resources and outcomes tell us that dropping acquittal 
rates over the last decade in federal court is a valid cause of concern.  
The acquittal trend reveals a system that probably distorts trial out-
comes and produces less reliable results than it once did.  The devices 
available to offer defendants a large and certain sentence discount for 
waiving trial—particularly those devices largely in the control of 
prosecutors—have come to dominate the practice of criminal law in 
the federal courts. 
C.  The Sentencing Law Nexus 
What guidance can this survey offer about the reforms needed to 
prevent the distortions from expected outcomes at trial?  Most conver-
sations about plea bargains eventually return to sentencing laws and 
practices, and this one is no exception.  Most of the devices that drive 
down acquittal rates are grounded in sentencing laws; hence, the best 
strategy for improving the reliability and public legitimacy of plea 
bargains should focus on the nexus between plea bargains and sen-
tencing. 
These are times for taking stock in federal sentencing. The Su-
preme Court, in Blakely v. Washington,216 overturned a state sentencing 
system that allowed a judge rather than a jury to find facts necessary to 
increase the authorized sentence.  In Booker v. United States, the Su-
preme Court applied this holding to the federal sentencing guidelines 
and restructured the statutes to require district court judges to use the 
guidelines on an “advisory” basis, leaving the judges free to impose a 
sentence outside the guidelines if such an outcome would better serve 
214 It would be especially important to study case-level data before drawing strong 
inferences from a finding about race and acquittals, and this study relies on district-
level data. 
215 See, e.g., Albonetti, supra note 194 (analyzing the relationship between race and 
guilty plea rates).   
216 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004). 
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the statutory purposes of sentencing.217  The sentence that a trial 
judge imposes is still subject to appellate review, and can be over-
turned if the sentence is “unreasonable.”218
This is not the place for an analysis of Blakely or Booker as a matter 
of constitutional law or of sound sentencing policy.219  The impor-
tance of these cases for our purposes is the upheaval they caused.  
Congress is now considering fundamental changes in the federal sen-
tencing laws---changes that the Supreme Court forced to the top of the 
legislative agenda.220  Attention to guilty pleas should now inform any 
wholesale revisions to federal sentencing law that occur during this 
unexpected effort of redesigning the system. 
The main threats to healthy federal guilty plea practices are sen-
tencing and charging practices that increase the size and certainty of 
the trial penalty.  To the extent that a guilty plea becomes a prerequi-
site to receiving a particular form of sentence discount, that discount 
undercuts the power of the trial to uncover the truth.  Furthermore, 
the best way to judge the tendency of a sentencing discount to influ-
ence the trial penalty is to check who controls the discount.  The his-
torical and statistical analyses in Parts III and IV support the common-
sense inference that federal prosecutors in our current system affect 
the trial penalty more than judges do.  Therefore, the most important 
target in reforming sentencing law should be rules that currently give 
prosecutors monopoly power to link sentence discounts to the defen-
dant’s choice to plead guilty. 
Two examples of such rules are the enhanced discount for accep-
tance of responsibility and downward departures based on a defen-
dant’s substantial assistance to the government in other investigations.  
217 125 S. Ct. 738, 768 (2005) (loosening the binding power of the sentencing 
guidelines). 
218 Id. at 766 (“Those factors [listed in the sentencing guidelines] in turn will 
guide appellate courts, as they have in the past, in determining whether a sentence is 
unreasonable.”). 
219 See generally Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure:  
The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 
(forthcoming Nov. 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=763804 (discussing Blakely and Booker as examples of a distinc-
tive style of constitutional reasoning); Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 
16 FED. SENT’G REP. 316 (June 2004) (discussing Blakely’s impact on the sentencing 
guidelines); Steven Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377 
(2005) (discussing criminal sentencing in light of Blakely). 
220 See Posting of Douglas A. Berman to Sentencing Law and Policy, A Bit of Booker 
Fix Buzz, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2005/10/ 
a_bit_of_booker.html (Oct. 2, 2005, 4:29 PM) (discussing an imminent congressional 
response to Booker). 
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For the latter discounts, the law grants the prosecutor sole power to 
award the discount,221 while in the case of acceptance of responsibility 
discounts, the prosecutor has always been powerfully persuasive.222  Al-
though the prosecutor’s basis for awarding these discounts is often 
opaque, it is clear to most defendants that a guilty plea is a necessary 
condition.  Restoring some judicial control over these sentence dis-
counts could weaken their link to guilty pleas, making them more 
available to defendants with the temerity to exercise constitutional 
trial rights. 
The remedy cobbled together by five Justices in Booker, while odd 
as a matter of severability doctrine, might be successful in policy 
terms.  It could shift federal plea practices away from the worst dan-
gers of trial distortion.  The basic thrust of the “advisory guidelines” 
system is to reassert the authority of the sentencing judge and to make 
less certain the prosecutor’s control over the means of delivering a 
trial penalty.  Districts will not move uniformly, but on the whole they 
could move in the direction of a more balanced exercise of sentenc-
ing power. 
The advisory guidelines envisioned in Booker will probably not, 
however, create a stable platform for federal sentencing.  Congress is 
likely to restructure the system, and the options are plentiful:  “guide-
lines without lids,” a streamlined set of aggravating facts, or a collec-
221 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2004) (permitting courts to 
depart from guidelines upon motion by the government due to defendant’s assistance 
in other matters); United States v. Wade, 504 U.S. 181, 187 (1992) (explaining that a 
defendant’s assistance does not guarantee such a departure from the guidelines, but 
that any departure is within the prosecutor’s discretion). 
222 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) (2004) (permitting prosecu-
tors to further decrease a sentence due to assistance when the defendant has clearly 
demonstrated acceptance of responsibility).  The 2003 Feeney Amendment solidified 
prosecutor control over the three-point acceptance of responsibility discounts, already 
a crucial cause of displaced acquittals.  See Michael M. O’Hear, Cooperation and Account-
ability After the Feeney Amendment, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 102 (Dec. 2003) (arguing for ex-
panded Justice Department control over the acceptance of responsibility discount).  
For instance, the 2003 law also empowered prosecutors to designate certain “fast-track” 
districts for the use of special sentence discounts that would increase the volume of 
guilty pleas.  See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of 
Children Today (PROTECT) Act § 401(d)(2) (2003) (establishing a de novo appellate 
standard of review for downward but not for upward departures); id. § 401(m)(2)(A) 
(instructing the Sentencing Commission to place further limits on downward depar-
tures); id. § 401(l)(2)(A) (mandating that downward departures and name of sentenc-
ing judge be reported to House and Senate Judiciary Committees). 
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tion of mandatory minimum penalties superimposed on the advisory 
guidelines.223
In this Article, I have not addressed the impact of mandatory 
minimum penalties on guilty plea practices,224 but these laws invoke 
familiar themes regarding prosecutorial monopoly power over sen-
tence discounts.  Mandatory minimum sentence laws exert a powerful 
pull on plea negotiations, because a prosecutor’s promise not to file 
(or to dismiss) charges that carry a mandatory minimum penalty can 
create enormous gaps in the sentence imposed and enormous incen-
tives to plead guilty.225  Mandatory minimum sentences might become 
the rule rather than the exception in the federal system as Congress 
reconstructs the sentencing system in the aftermath of Blakely and 
Booker,226 but legislators who care about accuracy in criminal justice 
should look to alternatives. 
Healthy revisions to the sentencing laws should give judges the au-
thority to second-guess the prosecutor’s desire to discount sentences 
and induce a guilty plea.  Yet there is a danger in such proposals, in 
that they put upward pressure on federal sentences.  The strategy of 
increasing the authority of judges to counterbalance prosecutors 
means that judges will reject more sentence discounts.  In a federal 
system that many (myself included) consider to be too severe already, 
this might be too high a price to pay for a more accurate system that 
values innocence. 
At the end of the day, it may become necessary to address severe 
sentences directly.  Legislatures often create high maximum sentences 
223 See Postings of Douglas A. Berman to Sentencing Law and Policy, Topical Ar-
chive:  Legislative Reactions to Booker and Blakely, http://sentencing.typepad.com/ 
sentencing_law_and_policy/legislative_reactions_to_booker_and_blakely (relating and 
evaluating possible legislative changes to the sentencing system). 
224 See supra note 200 for a discussion of why the study in Part IV does not include 
mandatory minimum charging as an independent variable. 
225 See JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM’N, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORTS WITH RECOMMENDA-
TIONS 26-27 (2004), http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/kennedy/ 
JusticeKennedyCommissionReportsFinal.pdf; Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Fed-
eral Sentencing Revolution:  How Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just 
Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 87, 97 (2003) (“[P]rosecutors exercise signifi-
cant control of sentence length through charging decisions and use sentencing phase 
mitigation to give the appearance of mitigation to induce pleas.”); Stephen J. Schul-
hofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 202 (1993) 
(“Mandatories then become little more than a bargaining chip, a ‘hammer’ which the 
prosecutor can invoke at her option, to obtain more guilty pleas under more favorable 
terms.”). 
226 See Keith Perine, ‘Heightened Tensions’ Fray Judicial-Legislative Relations, CQ 
WEEKLY, Sept. 18, 2004, at 2148 (addressing congressional concerns about using man-
datory minimums in response to “activist judges”). 
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with the express intention of giving prosecutors a “bargaining chip” to 
produce more guilty pleas.227  An overall reduction in the severity of 
authorized federal punishments would squeeze down the plea dis-
count that the prosecutor could offer.  That would translate into guilty 
pleas that do not target the weak cases destined for dismissal or ac-
quittal.  Less room for discounting sentences during plea negotiations 
leaves more room for truth to prosper. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the lessons for federal criminal justice are profound, the 
power of plea bargaining practices to displace acquittals and distort 
the truth-finding function of trials is not strictly a federal problem.  
The same can and does happen in state criminal justice, where the 
great bulk of criminal matters in the United States are processed.228  
The voting public in each state invests large amounts of public funds 
in criminal justice systems, and expects those systems to uncover the 
truth. 
There are reasons to think the problems of trial distortion are at 
least as important at the state level as in the federal courts.  Lower 
olume courts dealing with the most serious crimes are said to be the 
places where trials still matter.  The federal courts—which process far 
more felonies than misdemeanors—are thought to epitomize this sort 
of system.  The caseload for the federal prosecutors, defense attor-
neys, and judges is less crushing than the caseload for their state coun-
terparts.  While plea bargaining is recognized as the most important 
method for disposing of cases even in the federal system, the federal 
criminal trial is still thought to cast a long shadow. 
On the other hand, in higher volume courts at the lowest levels of 
the state court systems, trials almost never happen.  Those cases al-
most always result in guilty pleas.  In addition, there is only limited 
conversation between attorneys about how to resolve the case, because 
the “going rate” for each crime, committed by a defendant with a par-
ticular criminal record, is well established.229  Given the huge volume 
227 See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing prosecutors’ bargaining 
chips). 
228 See Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges:  Sentencing Infor-
mation Systems, Transparency, and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1351, 
1362-63 (2005) (articulating the need to gather state-level data that distinguishes be-
tween guilty pleas and convictions or acquittals). 
229 See Malcolm M. Feeley, Pleading Guilty in Lower Courts, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 461, 
463 (1979) (“[A] case whose outcome has been the result of vigorous bargaining or 
trial can establish a new ‘going rate’ for subsequent similar cases.”). 
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of cases involved and the limited scrutiny each receives, there is little 
reason to hope that the outcomes of plea negotiations come close to 
replicating the outcomes that a trial would produce.  The federal sys-
tem, for all its problems, is probably not alone in punishing trials so 
severely that the results do not deserve public confidence. 
The relationship between acquittal rates and guilty plea rates is 
especially relevant for those who still hope to blunt the power of the 
plea bargain and to give force instead to the public’s negative views on 
bargain justice.  Some forms of bargain justice are more harmful than 
others, and the critical task is to find economical ways of targeting and 
disposing of the greatest harms. 
In the absence of sorting techniques such as the one developed 
here, we can only speak in bromides about the coercion inherent in 
plea negotiations, but we cannot easily differentiate among concrete 
plea practices in specific times and places.  When no shorthand 
method of evaluation is available, we are left waiting for exhaustive 
case-by-case studies based on the knowledge of local insiders, and we 
must suspend moral judgment in the meantime.230  Accessible but 
non-definitive measures, such as the warning signals from the drop in 
acquittals, cure this paralysis.  Such a warning gives voice to those will-
ing to speak against possible injustice, even if the definitive proof of 
injustice in specific cases never arrives. 
 
230 See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 159, at 1297, for one of the few examples of 
detailed evaluations of plea bargaining practices, based on rare levels of cooperation 
from ten U.S. Attorney’s Offices. 
156 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 79 
APPENDIX 
Table A-1:  Regression of Annual Guilty Plea and Acquittal Rates  
on Factors Related to Caseload and Crime Types in  
Federal Criminal Cases, 1945-2002 
 
 Guilty Plea %  Acquittal %  
 Coefficient Standardized t Coefficient Standardized t 
Number of AUSAs  5.411E-05  2.001**  7.176 -1.22E-05 -1.855** -7.001 
Number of 
District Judges 
-3.30E-04 -1.163** -3.032  7.818E-05  1.131**  3.100 
Criminal Case 
Volume  
 1.845E-07  0.056  0.259  2.525E-07  0.313  1.531 
Civil and Criminal 
Cases per Judge 
-8.51E-06 -0.017 -0.190 -3.52E-05 -0.285** -3.399 
Average Days 
per Trial 
 2.38E-02  0.339  1.327 -4.90E-03 -0.287 -1.179 
Narcotics Case % -0.173 -0.501 -1.346  1.188E-02  0.141  0.400 
Immigration Case %  0.251  0.520**  4.915 -5.11E-02 -0.434** -4.318 
Fraud-Theft Case %  6.656E-02  0.108  0.964 -7.92E-03 -0.053 -0.495 
Constant   0.792  19.341  5.031E-02    5.304 
Adjusted R Square  0.793    0.813   
 
N = 58, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05  [Model N6] 
 
The model relies on estimates for the number of Assistant U.S. At-
torneys for the years 1945-1957, when Department of Justice annual 
reports do not publish the number.  Assuming some modest growth 
over time, the model sets the number at 500 for 1945-1950, and at 540 
for 1951-1957.  “Civil and criminal cases per AUSA” was calculated by 
adding the number of criminal cases terminated to the number of 
civil cases terminated in which the United States appeared as a party, 
and dividing the total by the number of prosecutors for each year.  
“Civil and criminal cases per judge” was calculated by adding the total 
number of criminal cases and civil cases terminated each year, and di-
viding by the number of district court judges on the bench for that 
year. 
 
